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PREFACE 
 
The Glucksman Institute for Research in Securities Markets awards fellowships each year 
to outstanding second year Stern MBA students to work on independent research projects 
under a faculty member's supervision. Four research projects completed by the 
Glucksman Fellows of 2011-2012 are included in this special issue of the Finance 
Department Working Paper Series. These papers focus on important topics in empirical 
financial economics. 
Samuel Welt, under the supervision of William Silber, analyzes the economic and 
political factors that determine the magnitude of increases in the debt ceiling voted by 
Congress. Karen Shortt, under the direction of Aswath Damodaran , investigates the 
relationship between corporate environmental performance and abnormal stock price 
movements of a firm. Oren Livne, under the supervision of Alexander Ljungqvist, 
provides an overview of the evolution of the private company secondary marketplace in  
the United States, and evaluates the ability of secondary market data to predict share 
price changes post IPO. Ismael Orenstein, under the supervision of Yakov Amihud, 
analyzes the impact of the Federal Reserve’s Quantitative Easing (QE) program on the  
relative pricing of treasury securities. These papers, reflecting the research effort of four 
outstanding Stern MBA students, are summarized in more detail in the Table of Contents 
on the next page. 
  
         
    William L. Silber, Director   
    Glucksman Institute     
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Since 1917 the U.S. has had an overall limit on the amount of federal debt allowed 
outstanding at one time.  To adjust for rising debt levels over time, Congress has repeatedly 
raised the debt limit in order to allow additional borrowing.1  Over the past 40 years, these votes 
have become especially charged as the federal debt and deficit spending is usually at the 
forefront of political debates.  Part 1 of this paper will provide an overview of the debt ceiling 
and the process through which Congress raises the debt limit.   
Part 2 uses a statistical model of historical debt ceiling votes to examine the factors 
influencing the magnitude of changes in the debt ceiling legislated by Congress.  The model 
includes economic factors, such as the level of interest rates, and political factors, such as the 
political makeup of the Presidency, House of Representatives, and Senate, to explain changes in 
the debt ceiling. The results show that the effects of economic factors far outweigh political 
considerations except when there are substantial negotiations between the president and 
Congress to alter the budget process as part of the debt ceiling vote.  
 Many arguments have been put forth both in support of, and against, the debt ceiling 
statute.2  Supporters argue that the debt ceiling brings attention to the country’s fiscal position 
and forces Congress and the President to take visible actions to monitor spending while allowing 
further borrowing.  Those in opposition argue that the debt ceiling does little to alter spending 
policies, and has a minimal effect on the amount of federal debt.  The uncertainty and 
administrative burden when the Treasury must take extraordinary actions has potential negative 
                                                            
1 For a discussion of the treatment of debt in the United States from WWI through the Great Depression, see 
KENNETH D. GARBADE, BIRTH OF A MARKET: THE U.S. TREASURY SECURITIES MARKET FROM THE GREAT WAR TO 
THE GREAT DEPRESSION (MIT Press, 2012). 
2 For general information regarding arguments both for and against the debt ceiling, see D. ANDREW AUSTIN & 
MINDY R. LEVIT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, THE DEBT LIMIT: HISTORY AND RECENT INCREASES 3-5 (Jan. 20, 
2012). 
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effects.  One additional critique of the debt ceiling is the idea that it can be held “hostage” or 
used as a “legislative pawn” by the minority legislative party in order to pass other laws or 
extract additional budget cuts. 3  Part 3 of this paper will conclude with two short case studies to 
highlight some of the specific impacts of politics during past debt crises. 
 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE STATUTORY DEBT CEILING 
II.1 The Debt Ceiling and Federal Debt Generally 
Unlike almost all other democratic countries, the U.S. places a cap on the total amount of 
debt allowed outstanding at one time.4  This is known as the “statutory debt limit” or “debt 
ceiling.”  Once the amount of outstanding federal debt reaches the debt ceiling, the Treasury can 
no longer issue additional debt to cover cash shortfalls needed to fund government operations 
and meet legal obligations.  For this reason, between 1950 and 2007, Congress acted 72 times to 
alter the debt ceiling, 63 of those times raising the limit.5  The original debt limit in 1917 was set 
at $11.5 billion6 and it currently stands at $16.394 trillion.7 
Starting with the Revolutionary War, the federal debt was closely related to war 
spending.  While debt would be issued to cover war expenditures, it was typically paid down 
following the conclusion of a war.  Initially, Congress would approve individual issuances of 
bonds for a specific purpose and provide the appropriate interest rate and term of the bond.8  
However, during World War I, expenditures grew to unprecedented levels.  In order to allow for 
                                                            
3 See Anita S. Krishnakumar, In Defense of the Debt Limit Statute, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 135 (2005) for a thorough 
support of the debt ceiling and data debunking the argument that the debt limit is successfully used as a “legislative 
pawn.” 
4 Denmark is the only other democratic country with a debt ceiling.  See Only One Democratic Country, Besides 
America, Has a Debt Ceiling, July 19, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/07/only-one-democratic-
country-besides-america-has-a-debt-ceiling/ (citing a Moody’s report by Steven Hess). 
5 The 72 actions affecting the debt ceiling were calculated using the criteria set out in Appendix A.1. 
6 Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-43, 40 Stat. 288. 
7 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, FY2013 Budget of the U.S. Government: Historical Tables, Table 7-3. 
8 BIRTH OF A MARKET: THE U.S. TREASURY SECURITIES MARKET FROM THE GREAT WAR TO THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION at 313-315.   
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more efficiency in federal borrowing, Congress passed the Second Liberty Bond Act, allowing 
Treasury the freedom to issue debt up to a set limit. 9  While Congress was still heavily involved 
in the process, and still held control over the interest rates of the debt issued, Treasury now had 
more freedom to determine the amount, terms, and conditions of federal debt to be issued.  This 
was the basis for the modern statutory debt limit.   
 Almost all outstanding federal debt is subject to the statutory debt limit.10  Two types of 
debt make up the debt subject to this statutory limit: debt held by the public and debt held by 
government agencies.  Debt held by the public includes borrowing from state and local 
governments, private investors, and foreign governments.11  Intragovernmental debt includes 
liabilities between different parts of the federal government, usually held in trust funds like the 
Social Security Trust Fund.12  The total of each of these two types of debt makes up the total debt 
subject to the debt ceiling. 
If outstanding debt reaches the debt limit, the government needs to rely on the current 
cash balance and incoming revenues to cover obligations.13  The process of raising the debt 
ceiling has at times become extremely contentious and debt ceiling raises could not be enacted 
before the outstanding federal debt ran up against the statutory limit.  In these circumstances, the 
Treasury Department has some special accounting measures that it can utilize to keep the 
government running, meet the country’s obligations, and buy time until Congress can raise the 
                                                            
9 Id. at 313-314. See also Pub. L. No. 65-43, 40 Stat. 288. 
10 A small percentage of federal debt outstanding is not subject to the debt limit.  For example, on February 29, 
2012, the Total Public Debt Outstanding was $15,488.891 billion while the Total Public Debt Subject to Limit was 
$15,446.261 billion, meaning approximately 0.28% of the Public Debt Outstanding was not subject to the limit.  To 
find the Debt to the Penny on a given date, visit http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/BPDLogin?application=np; to 
find the debt subject to the limit on a given date, see Table III-C of the Daily Treasury Statement, available at 
http://fms.treas.gov/dts/index.html. 
11 D. ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41815, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL DEBT 1 (May 11, 2011). 
12 Id. at 5 
13 MINDY R. LEVIT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41633, REACHING THE DEBT LIMIT: BACKGROUND AND POTENTIAL 
EFFECTS ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 7 (July 27, 2011). 
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debt limit.  These measures include postponing debt auctions, suspending new issuances of State 
and Local Government Series Securities, exchanging debt subject to the limit for Federal 
Financing Bank debt which is not subject to the limit,14 and suspending investments in certain 
government trust funds.15  In 1986, Congress gave explicit legislative approval to the Treasury 
Department to use certain measures when it determines that a “debt issuance suspension period” 
is needed to prevent the federal debt from exceeding the limit.16  While these measures can 
extend the time by which Congress must raise the debt limit, some of the negative effects include 
administrative burden, higher borrowing costs, and uncertainty over Treasury cash 
management.17 
Because the debt ceiling has always been raised when necessary, it is uncertain what 
actions the government would take if revenues and cash on hand could not cover all government 
obligations and Treasury exhausted all extraordinary measures.18  Figure 1 shows the level of the 
debt ceiling between 1950 and 2007 in nominal and real dollars.  The level of the debt ceiling 
has consistently risen, although the increases have drastically increased in the past 30 years. 
                                                            
14 Federal Financing Bank debt is an example of debt that is generally not subject to the debt limit.  It is, however, 
subject to its own limit of $15 billion.  OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL DEBT at 5. 
15 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-203, DELAYS CREATE DEBT MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES AND 
INCREASE UNCERTAINTY IN THE TREASURY MARKET 7 (Feb. 2011). 
16 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874. 
17 DELAYS CREATE DEBT MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES AND INCREASE UNCERTAINTY IN THE TREASURY MARKET at 
10-15. 
18 For more information on the possible actions that the government could take to avoid default see REACHING THE 
DEBT LIMIT: BACKGROUND AND POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS. 
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Figure 1: Nominal and Real Debt Limit (1950-2007) 
 
 
Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget, FY2013 Budget of the U.S. Government: Historical Tables, Table 
7-3; U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/cpi/tables.htm
 
 
II.2  Process to Raise the Debt Ceiling 
 Because the debt limit is currently codified in Section 3101(b) of Title 31 of the United 
States Code,19 adjustments to the debt limit are enacted as amendments to the statute by either 
replacing the debt limit amount, or adding a temporary limit with an expiration date. 20  The 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 requires the House and Senate to adopt a concurrent 
resolution on the budget before considering debt limit legislation. 21  Even though the budget 
resolution recommends the appropriate level of the debt limit based on the projected budget 
surplus or deficit, Congress must enact separate legislation to actually raise the debt limit 
                                                            
19 31 U.S.C. § 3101(b) (2012). 
20 BILL HENIFF JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21519, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES FOR ADJUSTING THE DEBT LIMIT: 
A BRIEF OVERVIEW 1 (Mar. 18, 2010). 
21 Id. at 1. 
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because a budget resolution does not become law.22  There are three different legislative 
procedures in which Congress can adjust the amount of the debt limit. 23 
 Regular Legislative Procedures: The House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate 
Finance Committee may originate legislation adjusting the debt limit at any time.  The measures 
may be stand-alone, or they may be passed in conjunction with other legislation.  The bill, 
similar to any other legislation, must pass each house of Congress with a majority vote and must 
then be signed by the President.24 
 Gephardt Rule Procedures: Debt limit legislation may also be initiated under House Rule 
XXVIII, commonly known as the Gephardt Rule.  The Gephardt Rule was enacted in 1979 as an 
amendment to a temporary debt limit increase in response to the repeated, and politically 
contentious, votes to raise the debt ceiling.  The purpose of the rule was to place consideration of 
the debt limit alongside the overall budget policies, while reducing the amount of time spent and 
number of votes in the House on the issue of raising the limit.25  When a budget resolution is 
adopted, the Gephardt rule requires that the House clerk automatically transmit to the Senate a 
joint resolution changing the debt limit by the amount recommended in the budget resolution. 26  
The resolution is deemed to have passed the House by the same vote as the vote on the budget 
resolution. 27  The Senate does not have a similar procedure, so it must consider the House joint 
resolution under the regular legislative process. 
 From the time the rule was established in 1980 through March 2010, the House 
originated 20 joint resolutions under this procedure, the Senate passed 16 of these joint 
                                                            
22 ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL  BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 18-19 (Brookings Institution Press, 3d ed. 
2007). 
23 LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES FOR ADJUSTING THE DEBT LIMIT at 1. 
24 Id. at 2. 
25 BILL HENIFF JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31913, DEVELOPING DEBT-LIMIT LEGISLATION: THE HOUSE’S 
“GEPHARDT RULE” 1 (Mar. 18, 2010) 
26 Id. at 3. 
27 Id. 
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resolutions, and 15 were enacted into law.28  In 14 years during that period (1988, 1990-1991, 
1994-2002, 2004, and 2006), the rule did not apply or was not used due to suspension or repeal, 
or a budget resolution was not finally agreed to.29 
 Budget Reconciliation Process: The reconciliation process is an optional procedure, and 
its main purpose is to enhance Congress’s ability to change current law affecting revenue, 
mandatory spending, and debt limit levels to conform with the budget resolution.30  
Reconciliation legislation is subject to expedited consideration in both chambers, and in the 
Senate in particular, debate is limited, amendments must be germane, and extraneous matter is 
not allowed.31  While reconciliation is usually used to adjust revenue and spending levels, the 
debt limit was changed under reconciliation procedures as part of the Budget Acts of 1986, 1990, 
1993, and 1997.32 
 
III. DATA AND ANALYSIS  
III.1  Overview and Description of Debt Ceiling Changes 
This study examines the factors affecting the magnitude of Congressional changes to the 
debt ceiling using a multivariate regression analysis. The time period analyzed is 1950 through 
2007.  This period avoids the effects of WWII spending as well as the impact of the 2008 World 
Financial Crisis. The dependent variable is the magnitude of the debt ceiling change in 2007 
dollars. Putting everything in 2007 dollars adjusts the debt ceiling for inflation.  
The data are based on votes by Congress on the debt ceiling, but eliminate temporary 
raises of 30 days or less, temporary date extensions of 30 days or less, and other votes meeting 
                                                            
28 LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES FOR ADJUSTING THE DEBT LIMIT at 3. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Schick at 142. 
32 LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES FOR ADJUSTING THE DEBT LIMIT at 4. 
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specific criteria. Appendix A.1 provides a full explanation of data selection.  The outcome of the 
process results in a dataset of 72 Congressional votes affecting the debt ceiling.  During the 58 
years in this time period, at least one debt limit change occurred in 43 of the years.  As can be 
seen in Figure 2, more than one debt limit change occurred in twenty years. 
  Figure 2: Number of Debt Ceiling Actions per Year 
 
 
Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget, FY2013 Budget of the U.S. Government: Historical Tables, Table 
7-3; See Appendix A.1 for data selection criteria
 
 
 In 2007 dollars, the minimum debt limit change during this period was a decrease of 
$22.87 billion, and the maximum change was $1,507 billion. 33  The average debt limit change 
was $210.76 billion, however, as the distribution of dollar changes in Figure 3 shows, the large 
range and high standard deviation skews this number.  The median debt limit change was $93.79 
billion. 
                                                            
33 In nominal dollars, the minimum single debt ceiling change was -$3 billion (in 1956, 1957, and 1962), and the 
maximum change was $984 billion (in 2003). 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Debt Ceiling Change Amounts (1950-2007) 
 
Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget, FY2013 Budget of the U.S. Government: Historical Tables, Table 
7-3; U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/cpi/tables.htm
 
 
III.2  The Model 
 The main independent variables influencing the magnitude of the debt ceiling change    
fall into two broad categories – economic factors and political factors.  A key hypothesis to be 
tested is whether political control of both chambers of Congress and the Presidency influences 
the amount that the debt ceiling is raised. Since Congress does not like to vote for a debt ceiling 
increase, we might expect a larger increase to avoid repeated votes if the same party controls the 
White House and Congress.   
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To determine the potential impact of economic and political factors on debt ceiling 
legislation, I estimate an equation of the following form: 
 
 
 
 
(1)  ΔDC = β0 + β1*INTRATE-1 + β2*RECESSION + β3*ΔDEBT-1 + 
β4*POLCONTROL + β5*EY + β6*EVENT 
 
 
 
 
The definitions and expected signs of the variables are as follows:  
 ΔDC (dependent variable): 
o The magnitude of the debt ceiling change in billions of 2007 dollars.34 
 INTRATE-1: 
o The average interest rate, in percentage points, on the 10 Year U.S. Treasury bond 
for the month prior to the occurrence of the debt ceiling vote. 
o The expected sign is negative because higher interest rates result in a higher 
expense in issuing debt, and typically signal a lower willingness to issue 
additional debt. 
 RECESSION: 
o A dummy variable equal to 1 if the debt ceiling vote occurs during a recession, 
and equal to 0 otherwise. 
o The expected sign is positive because a recession leads to lower tax revenues, 
higher mandatory government expenditures, and potential stimulus spending. 
                                                            
34 All dollar amounts were adjusted to 2007 dollars by multiplying the nominal dollar amount by the ratio of the 
2007 CPI to the applicable year’s CPI.  CPI data used can be found at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/tables.htm. 
Economic Factors
Political Factors
 12 
 
 ΔDEBT-1: 
o The magnitude, in billions of 2007 dollars, that the outstanding federal debt 
subject to the statutory limit changed in the fiscal year prior to the year that the 
debt ceiling vote occurred. 
o The expected sign is positive because greater upward pressure on the outstanding 
debt will result in the need to raise the debt ceiling by a greater amount. 
 POLCONTROL: 
o A dummy variable equal to 1 if at the time of the vote, the House, Senate, and 
Presidency were all controlled by the same political party, and is zero otherwise. 
o The expected sign is positive because common control will lead to less 
negotiation and a desire to avoid numerous future debt ceiling votes. 
 EY: 
o A dummy variable equal to 1 if the debt ceiling vote occurred during a 
presidential election year and is zero otherwise.35 
o The expected sign is negative due to the fact that each party will be less willing to 
raise the debt ceiling when it might have negative political implications in the 
upcoming presidential election. 
 EVENT: 
o A dummy variable equal to 1 if the debt ceiling vote occurred in conjunction with 
a statutory change to the budget process related to deficit reduction, and is zero 
otherwise.  This results in a value equal to 1 for debt ceiling votes that occurred in 
conjunction with the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control (Gramm-
                                                            
35 Two debt ceiling votes occurred during Election Years but after the election took place.  These two votes have a 
value equal to 0 for EY: 12/19/1980 and 11/19/2004. 
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Rudman-Hollings) Act of 1985; the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Reaffirmation (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings II) Act of 1987; the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990; the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993; and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. 36 
o The expected sign of this variable is positive because these events usually involve 
large scale budget negotiations resulting in the need for greater debt to initially 
cover new programs.  In addition, Congress and the President are more willing to 
raise the debt ceiling by a greater amount because they think that the new budget 
process will keep debt under control.  
III.3  Regression Results 
The regression results for equation (1) can be found in Table 1.37  The estimated 
coefficients show that the impact of economic variables far outweighs the impact of political 
variables except in cases when debt ceiling raises are enacted in conjunction with statutory 
changes to the budget process.  All three economic variables were statistically significant and 
had the expected signs.  All of the political variables had the expected sign, however, only 
EVENT was statistically significant.  
                                                            
36 For a list of laws related to the congressional budget process through 2008, see Committee on the Budget of the 
U.S. House Of Representatives, Compilation of Laws and Rules Relating to the Congressional Budget Process, as 
Amended Through November 30, 2008 (Comm. Print 2008) at iii-v.  For a list of all debt ceiling bills that were 
enacted in conjunction with other bills, see Justin Murray, Cong. Research Serv., R41814, Votes on Measures to 
Adjust the Statutory Debt Limit, 1978 to Present (Feb. 1, 2012).  The intersection of these two sources results in the 
inclusions of the following events in the data: Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control (Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings) Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-177; Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation (Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings II) Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-119; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508; 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-66; Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33. 
37 See Appendix A.4 for the complete output of the regression program. 
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Table 1: Summary Regression Results 
 
 
 
Note: Gray cells are statistically significant with a t-Stat greater than 2. 
 
I also used alternative specifications of some of the variables to determine whether the 
precise definitions altered the results.  For example, an average of the previous three months’ 
interest rates was used instead of the previous month only.  The previous year budget 
deficit/surplus was used instead of the change in outstanding debt as a proxy for upward pressure 
on outstanding debt.  Neither of these changes altered the results.  For political factors, I tried 
common party control between the House and Senate regardless of the political party of the 
President, but this did not yield statistically significant results.  I also used House election years 
instead of Presidential election years but this did not yield a statistically significant result either. 
III.4  Implications 
The results show a strong statistically significant relationship between the magnitude of 
the change in the debt ceiling and each of the economic factors.  The negative coefficient of 
INTRATE-1 suggests that higher interest rates leading up to a debt ceiling raise will result in a 
lower magnitude raise of approximately -$24.5 billion per interest rate percentage point.  The 
positive coefficient of RECESSION suggests that the debt ceiling will be raised by a greater 
magnitude during a recession than during an expansionary period – an effect of approximately 
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$149.7 billion.  The positive coefficient of ΔDEBT-1 suggests that the greater the increase in 
federal debt outstanding during the fiscal year prior to a debt ceiling raise, the greater the 
magnitude of the debt ceiling raise – an effect of approximately $1.0 billion for every $1.0 
billion increase in debt outstanding.  This shows that during the time period analyzed, economic 
factors played a significant role in the size of debt ceiling increases.  
  The only systematic political factor influencing the magnitude of the debt ceiling raise is 
EVENT, the debt ceiling increases that occurred in conjunction with legislated changes in the 
statutory budget process.  The impact of EVENT is quite powerful. The estimated coefficient of 
EVENT implies that, on average, when the debt ceiling is raised in conjunction with a statutory 
change to the budget process, the debt ceiling will be raised by approximately $448.8 billion, 
everything else held constant. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Acts of 1985 and 1987, the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1990 and 1993, and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
fall into this category.38  
 
IV. CASE STUDIES 
The regression model suggests that some political events, like budget negotiations to alter 
the statutory budget process,  have an impact on the magnitude of the debt limit increase, even 
though more general political effects, like election year votes, have no systematic impact. This 
section focuses on two historical debt crises to examine more specific ways that political conflict 
can affect votes on the debt ceiling. 
                                                            
38 See supra Note 36. 
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Case Study I: 1985 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act 
In 1981, President Reagan took office committed to three basic policy goals: 1) defense 
buildup, 2) reduction in taxes, and 3) cuts in domestic program spending.39  The economic 
growth stimulated by the tax cuts along with the reduced domestic spending was expected to 
cover the increased defense spending and lost tax revenue.40  While defense spending accelerated 
and dramatic tax cuts were passed, a lack of consensus among Congress prevented the cut in 
domestic spending that Reagan had expected.41  In 1985, the approximate $200 billion annual 
deficit was recognized as a problem, but the Reagan administration’s views that defense buildup 
must continue and tax hikes were off the table conflicted with the view of House Democrats that 
additional cuts in domestic spending were not acceptable.42 
Through the summer of 1985, various proposals were put forth to rein in the deficit, but 
disagreements between the President and Congress about how this should be done (even between 
the Senate Republicans and the President), prevented a deal from being reached.43 In September 
1985, a bipartisan group of senators decided to use a vote to increase the debt ceiling as a vehicle 
to pass what became known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) Act.44  The purpose of the 
Act was to eliminate the federal deficit in five years by specifying predetermined deficit 
maximums and implementing automatic across-the-board cuts if targets were not met. 
Based on the contentious nature of the bill, debate dragged on despite the threat of 
reaching the debt limit.  Throughout September and October of 1985, Treasury could not fully 
invest receipts of various trust funds without exceeding the limit, delayed normal auctions of 
                                                            
39 Harry S. Havens, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings: Origins and Implementation, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 6-7 (Autumn 
1986). 
40 Id. at 7. 
41 Id. at 7. 
42 Id. at 7. 
43 Id. at 9. 
44 Id. at 9. 
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federal securities, and was forced to exchange $5 billion of securities subject to the debt limit 
with $5 billion of Federal Financing Bank securities in order to raise cash to pay immediate 
obligations.45 
When November arrived, and still no resolution had occurred, Treasury began to 
disinvest certain holdings of federal debt held in federal trust funds in order to free up more room 
under the debt ceiling to sell securities to the public.46  On November 15, 1985, $16 billion in 
interest payments and a refinancing of $10 billion in notes came due.47  Treasury did not have 
sufficient operating cash, and did not have means available to raise the necessary funds to avoid 
a default.  A temporary increase in the debt limit of $70 billion through December 6, 1985 
allowed Treasury enough borrowing authority to obtain the funds needed to cover the 
obligations.48 
The debate over GRH continued beyond the December 6th temporary extension.  This 
caused the debt limit to revert to its previous permanent level which was below the level of 
outstanding federal debt.49  This put Treasury in an extremely tight position, and it again was 
forced to suspend auctions and stop investing trust fund receipts in government debt.50  Finally, 
on December 12, 1985, the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 was 
enacted, concurrently raising the debt limit to $2,078.7 billion.51  Also included in the legislation 
was authority for Treasury to fully compensate the trust funds for interest losses that occurred 
                                                            
45 PHILIP D. WINTERS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-805E, PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT LEGISLATION: A BRIEF HISTORY AND 
CONTROVERSIES IN THE 1980S AND 1990S 6-7 (Mar. 28, 2010). 
46 Id. at 7. 
47 Id. at 7. 
48 Id. at 7-8. 
49 Id. at 8. 
50 Id. at 8. 
51 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-177, 99 
Stat. 1037. 
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when Treasury failed to reinvest receipts.52  Treasury immediately sold debt to the public to 
finance federal activities and to compensate these trust funds.53 
In response to the measures taken during the GRH crisis, as part of the Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act of 1986, Congress gave the Treasury Secretary authority to declare a “debt 
issuance suspension period” or “DISP.”54  During a DISP, Treasury is allowed to suspend 
investment in, or redeem early, certain government securities for selected government funds.55  
Setting the process, and giving explicit approval of certain measures helped to alleviate 
uncertainty over what actions Treasury was allowed to take during a debt crisis. 
Also in 1986, the Supreme Court struck down the automatic cuts set out in GRH, finding 
the role of the Comptroller General to be unconstitutional.56  While efforts to restore the 
automatic cuts initially failed, a GRH fix was adopted in 1987 after the debt ceiling raise was 
again used as a lever. 57  GRHII fixed the constitutional flaw, revised deficit targets through 
1993, and raised the debt limit from $2.1 trillion to $2.8 trillion.58 
Case Study II: 1995-1996 Contract with America Showdown 
In 1994, the midterm elections gave the Republican Party a majority of seats in the House 
for the first time since 1954.59  Newt Gingrich, the new Speaker of the House, was instrumental 
in putting forth a party platform known as the Contract with America, which committed 
                                                            
52 Id. 
53 A BRIEF HISTORY AND CONTROVERSIES IN THE 1980S AND 1990S at 8. 
54 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874. 
55 A BRIEF HISTORY AND CONTROVERSIES IN THE 1980S AND 1990S at 8. 
56 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
57 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings II) Act of 1987, Pub. 
L. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754. 
58 Id. 
59 Schick at 26.  See also CHARLES O. JONES, CLINTON AND CONGRESS, 1993-1996: RISK, RESTORATION, AND 
REELECTION at 96 (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Publishing Division of the University, 1999) for details 
surrounding the unexpected Republican election success. 
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Republican candidates to certain issues.60  As a sign of the political discourse during the election 
season, Gingrich was quoted in the Washington Post as saying “We will cooperate with anyone, 
and we’ll compromise with no one.”61  This “no-compromise” attitude was taken into the first 
100 days of the new 1995 Congressional session along with the commitment to the Contract with 
America.62  Gingrich was able to bring all items in the Contract with America to a vote in the 
House, and all were passed except for a constitutional amendment on term limits.63  However, 
conflict occurred when President Clinton refused to agree to spending cuts in Medicare, 
Medicaid, and non-defense spending.  Gingrich explicitly threatened to prevent a vote raising the 
debt ceiling in order to force President Clinton to sign a Republican budget bill.64 
In the summer of 1995, the debt ceiling stood at $4.9 trillion.  On June 29, 1995, 
Congress passed a budget resolution calling for the debt ceiling to be raised to $5.5 trillion.65, 66  
On July 17, 1995, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin sent a letter to Congress requesting an 
increase in the debt ceiling by the end of October, and followed up this letter on September 18, 
1995 urging Congress to increase the debt ceiling regardless of a resolution to the budget 
debate.67  Between October 17 and November 8, Treasury postponed auctions of Treasury bills 
to avoid exceeding the debt limit.68  On November 10, Congress passed a temporary debt ceiling 
increase of $67 billion, while at the same time repealing the Treasury Secretary’s authority to 
                                                            
60 Jones at 108.   
61 Jones at 114.   
62 Jones at 119.   
63 Id.   
64 ROBERT E. RUBIN & JACOB WEISBERG, IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: TOUGH CHOICES FROM WALL STREET TO 
WASHINGTON at 169 (Random House 2003). 
65 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/AIMD-96-130, DEBT CEILING: ANALYSIS OF ACTIONS DURING THE 
1995-1996 CRISIS (August 1996), Table 2.1. 
66 See Section 1 discussing the requirements to list a public debt level in the budget resolution, but the debt limit can 
only be raised through separate legislation. 
67 See ANALYSIS OF ACTIONS DURING THE 1995-1996 CRISIS, Table 2.1. 
68 Id.  
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utilize certain extraordinary measures.69  A stopgap resolution to keep the government running 
was also passed.70  President Clinton vetoed both of these bills.71  The federal government shut 
down on November 14 until a temporary resolution was passed and signed on November 20.72 
As a result of the failure to increase the debt limit, on November 15, Secretary Rubin 
declared a debt issuance suspension period in order to raise money to make interest payments 
that were coming due.73  The fact that Treasury was able to extend the deadline of a default 
weakened Gingrich’s strategy of using the debt ceiling as a lever.74  On November 30, Congress 
passed a Balanced Budget Act, concurrently raising the debt ceiling to $5.5 trillion.75  However, 
President Clinton again vetoed this bill on December 6.76  The temporary resolution expired on 
December 15, and the government shut down again.  At the beginning of January, a new 
continuing resolution was passed, ending the government shut down on January 6, 1996.77 
However, a debt ceiling agreement still had not been reached.  Treasury again notified 
Congress that additional extraordinary measures would be needed without a debt ceiling raise.78  
Specifically, $30 billion in Social Security payments would not be paid.  In order to avoid 
missing Social Security payments without raising the debt ceiling, Congress authorized Treasury 
                                                            
69 Id.  
70 Adam Clymer, House Approves Stopgap Budget and Higher Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1995, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/11/us/house-approves-stopgap-budget-and-higher-debt.html. 
71 Adam Clymer, Battle Over The Budget: The Overview;President Vetoes Stopgap Budget; Shutdown Looms, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/14/us/battle-over-budget-overview-president-vetoes-
stopgap-budget-shutdown-looms.html. 
72 Todd S. Purdum, Battle Over The Budget: The Overview; President and G.O.P. Agree to End Federal Shutdown 
and to Negotiate a Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/20/us/battle-over-budget-
overview-president-gop-agree-end-federal-shutdown-negotiate.html. 
73 See ANALYSIS OF ACTIONS DURING THE 1995-1996 CRISIS, Table 2.1. 
74 Rubin at 172. 
75 See ANALYSIS OF ACTIONS DURING THE 1995-1996 CRISIS, Table 2.1. 
76 Todd S. Purdum, As Long Promised, President Vetoes the G.O.P. Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1995, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/07/us/as-long-promised-president-vetoes-the-gop-budget.html. 
77 Adam Clymer, Congress Votes to Return 760,000 to Federal Payroll and Resume Some Services; Step is 
Temporary, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/06/us/congress-votes-return-760000-
federal-payroll-resume-someservices-step-temporary.html. 
78 See ANALYSIS OF ACTIONS DURING THE 1995-1996 CRISIS, Table 2.1. 
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to issue debt that was exempt from the debt limit to make the payments.79  Finally, on March 29, 
1996, the debt ceiling was raised to $5.5 trillion and Treasury began to restore the appropriate 
trust funds for the losses incurred during the debt crisis.80 
While the debt crisis ended in March of 1996, the budget debate was not resolved until 
August 1997 when President Clinton and Congress agreed to a seven year balanced budget plan 
made up of both spending cuts and tax increases.81  The Budget Act included a debt ceiling raise 
from $5.5 trillion to $5.95 trillion which was expected to last until December 1999, but actually 
lasted until June 2002.82 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The formal statistical model developed above shows that economic factors, such as 
recessions and the level of interest rates, play a significant role in Congressional votes to raise 
the debt ceiling. General political factors, such as whether the votes are taken during an election 
year, do not affect the magnitude of the debt ceiling increase, but the model shows that votes to 
raise the debt ceiling taken together with a legislative change to the budget process produce a 
significantly larger increase in the debt ceiling than otherwise. 
                                                            
79 See ANALYSIS OF ACTIONS DURING THE 1995-1996 CRISIS, Table 2.1. 
80 Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 875 (increasing the debt limit to 
$5,500 billion). 
81 "Budget Reconciliation, 1997 Legislative Overview." In Congress and the Nation, 1997-2001, vol. 10, 48. 
Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2002. http://library.cqpress.com/catn/catn97-97-6343-324298. 
82 "Reconciliation Spending Cuts, 1997 Legislative Chronology." In Congress and the Nation, 1997-2001, vol. 10, 
50. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2002. http://library.cqpress.com/catn/catn97-97-6343-324301. 
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APPENDIX 
A.1  DATA SELECTION CRITERIA 
Historical Table 7.3 from the Office of Management and Budget details all actions 
affecting the statutory debt limit from 1940 to the Present.  Data used in this study was selected 
from Table 7.3 based on the following criteria: 
 Criteria Description Reasoning and Explanations 
1 Excluded Actions 
before 1950 and after 
2007 
Reasoning: To eliminate any effects of World War II and the 
Financial Crisis of 2008 
2 Excluded Temporary 
Raises 30 Days or 
Less 
Reasoning: To eliminate raises with the sole purpose of buying 
more time until a more permanent action could be taken 
3 Excluded Temporary 
Date Extensions of 30 
Days or Less 
Reasoning: To eliminate date extensions with the sole purpose of 
buying more time until a more permanent action could be taken 
4 Date Extensions 
Greater than 30 days 
were included as a $0 
Raise 
Reasoning: To include Congress’ conscious decision not to let a 
temporary extension expire, but not to raise the amount of the 
limit 
5 Excluded Temporary 
Reversions of 30 Days 
or Less 
Reasoning: To eliminate reversions that occurred when a decision 
could not be reached, but an action rectified the situation promptly
 E.g. In 1977, the permanent portion of the debt limit was $400B, 
and the temporary limit was $300B.  On 9/30/77, the temporary 
limit expired, and the total debt limit reverted from $700B to 
$400B.  On 10/4/77 the debt limit was raised to $752B.  The 
study views this event as a $52B raise in the debt limit, ignoring 
the less than 30 day reversion. 
 Note: If after a temporary reversion the limit was raised to less 
than the previous limit, this was counted as a decrease for the 
difference. 
6 Excluded Any Raises 
Fully Superseded by a 
Subsequent Raise 
Reasoning: The set debt limit never went into effect, and the 
subsequent debt limit raise was based on the previous debt limit 
level 
 For example: 
 6/1/62: Congress set the debt limit for the date period 
6/25/63 through 6/30/63. 
 5/29/63: Before the initial raise became effective, a new 
debt limit was set. 
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 Criteria Description Reasoning and Explanations 
7 Used Statute 
Approval Date to 
determine 
Independent 
Variables if multiple 
staged raises were 
approved in one vote 
 Reasoning: Study is testing the decision-making process at the 
time of the vote to enact the debt limit raise 
 E.g. If on 6/30/76, the debt limit was set for two subsequent 
phases, 7/1/76 through 3/31/77 and 4/1/77 through 9/30/77, the 
makeup of Congress for the second raise beginning in 1977 is 
tested at the date of the vote in 1976. 
8 If a Permanent Raise 
and Temporary Raise 
were approved 
together, the total 
amount of the raise 
was used in 
calculating the 
increase 
Reasoning: The overall level of the limit, as long as the temporary 
portion meets the criteria discussed above, is effectively the total 
of the two portion raises 
 E.g. If Congress raised the Permanent portion of the debt limit 
from $358B to $365B, and at the same time raised the 
Temporary portion of the debt limit from $7B to $12B, the data 
counts this as a $12B total increase in the debt limit. 
9 Excluded Actions Not 
Affecting the Limit 
Amount 
Reasoning: In 1996, two actions exempted certain securities from 
counting towards the statutory debt limit in order to temporarily 
prevent default during a debt crisis.  This data was excluded from 
the study. 
10 Adjusted Debt Limit 
Amount enacted 
2/19/1975 as 89 Stat. 5 
from $577B to $531B 
Reasoning: Independent analysis of 89 Stat. 5 shows the proper 
debt limit based on the statute should be $531B 
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A.2  DATA SAMPLE 
 The data sample for this study, compiled using the data criteria discussed in Appendix 
A.1, is included below. 
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8/28/1954 281 46.25 2.30 0 54.26 1 0 0 6/30/1976 700 65.59 7.90 0 227.48 0 1 0
6/30/1955 281 0.00 2.76 0 39.76 0 0 0 10/4/1977 752 177.92 7.34 0 318.30 1 0 0
7/9/1956 278 -22.87 3.00 0 22.97 0 1 0 3/27/1978 752 0.00 8.03 0 268.27 1 0 0
7/1/1957 275 -22.14 3.80 0 -13.18 0 0 0 8/3/1978 798 146.28 8.64 0 268.27 1 0 0
2/26/1958 280 35.87 3.09 1 -11.06 0 0 0 4/2/1979 830 91.39 9.12 0 231.28 1 0 0
9/2/1958 288 57.40 3.54 0 -11.06 0 0 0 9/29/1979 879 139.94 9.03 0 231.28 1 0 0
6/30/1959 295 49.88 4.31 0 45.02 0 0 0 6/28/1980 925 115.75 10.18 1 156.86 1 1 0
6/30/1960 293 -14.01 4.35 1 50.05 0 1 0 12/19/1980 935.1 25.41 12.68 0 156.86 1 0 0
6/30/1961 298 34.67 3.71 0 9.86 1 0 0 2/7/1981 985 113.82 12.57 0 204.09 0 0 0
3/13/1962 300 13.73 4.04 0 17.20 1 0 0 9/30/1981 1079.8 216.24 14.94 1 204.09 0 0 0
7/1/1962 308 54.93 3.91 0 17.20 1 0 0 6/28/1982 1143.1 136.01 13.62 1 205.51 0 0 0
7/1/1962 305 -20.60 3.91 0 17.20 1 0 0 9/30/1982 1290.2 316.06 13.06 1 205.51 0 0 0
5/29/1963 307 13.55 3.97 0 62.24 1 0 0 5/26/1983 1389 205.68 10.40 0 309.61 0 0 0
5/29/1963 309 13.55 3.97 0 62.24 1 0 0 11/21/1983 1490 210.26 11.54 0 309.61 0 0 0
8/27/1963 309 0.00 4.02 0 62.24 1 0 0 5/25/1984 1520 59.87 12.63 0 489.29 0 1 0
11/26/1963 315 40.66 4.11 0 62.24 1 0 0 7/6/1984 1573 105.77 13.56 0 489.29 0 1 0
6/29/1964 324 60.20 4.20 0 51.15 1 1 0 10/13/1984 1823.8 500.49 12.52 0 489.29 0 1 0
6/24/1965 328 26.33 4.21 0 37.86 1 0 0 12/12/1985 2078.7 491.18 9.78 0 389.18 0 0 1
6/24/1966 330 12.80 4.78 0 36.49 1 0 0 8/21/1986 2111 61.11 7.30 0 483.28 0 0 0
3/2/1967 336 37.25 4.63 0 13.87 1 0 0 10/21/1986 2300 357.55 7.45 0 483.28 0 0 0
6/30/1967 365 180.03 4.85 0 13.87 1 0 0 5/15/1987 2320 36.50 8.02 0 543.33 0 0 0
4/7/1969 377 67.80 6.30 0 151.28 0 0 0 8/10/1987 2352 58.41 8.45 0 543.33 0 0 0
6/30/1970 395 96.19 7.91 1 42.78 0 0 0 9/29/1987 2800 817.69 8.76 0 543.33 0 0 1
3/17/1971 430 179.18 6.11 0 88.14 0 0 0 8/7/1989 2870 117.05 8.02 0 439.67 0 0 0
3/15/1972 450 99.21 6.08 0 133.36 0 1 0 11/8/1989 3122.7 422.54 8.01 0 439.67 0 0 0
7/1/1972 450 0.00 6.11 0 133.36 0 1 0 8/9/1990 3195 114.70 8.47 1 406.16 0 0 0
10/27/1972 465 74.41 6.55 0 133.36 0 1 0 11/5/1990 4145 1,507.08 8.72 1 406.16 0 0 1
7/1/1973 465 0.00 6.90 0 144.35 0 0 0 4/6/1993 4370 322.85 5.98 0 595.98 1 0 0
12/3/1973 475.7 49.97 6.73 1 144.35 0 0 0 8/10/1993 4900 760.49 5.81 0 595.98 1 0 1
6/30/1974 495 81.17 7.58 1 142.49 0 0 0 3/29/1996 5500 792.89 5.81 0 379.95 0 1 0
2/19/1975 531 138.74 7.50 1 71.15 0 0 0 8/5/1997 5950 581.33 6.22 0 333.80 0 0 1
6/30/1975 577 177.28 8.06 0 71.15 0 0 0 6/28/2002 6400 518.64 5.16 0 165.28 0 0 0
11/14/1975 595 69.37 8.14 0 71.15 0 0 0 5/27/2003 7384 1,108.83 3.96 0 494.01 1 0 0
3/15/1976 627 116.61 7.79 0 227.48 0 1 0 11/19/2004 8184 878.10 4.10 0 649.31 1 0 0
6/30/1976 636 32.80 7.90 0 227.48 0 1 0 3/20/2006 8965 803.24 4.57 0 570.84 1 0 0
6/30/1976 682 167.62 7.90 0 227.48 0 1 0 9/29/2007 9815 850.00 4.67 0 564.88 0 0 0
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A.3 SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
Table A.3-1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
  
 
Table A.3-2: Independent Variable Correlation Table 
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A.4 REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table A.4-1: Regression Results 
 
 
 
Note: Gray cells are statistically significant with a t-Stat greater than 2. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The emission of greenhouse gases from large corporations has contributed to a 
number of environmental problems, most notably climate change.  As the problems 
associated with environmentally irresponsible actions become more severe (the eight 
warmest years on record since 1850 have all occurred since 1998), stakeholders are 
increasingly pressuring companies to ‘go green.’1  
Companies have responded to this growing concern by dedicating a portion of their 
corporate budgets to environmentally friendly initiatives.  Many U.S. companies now 
track their environmental progress in annual sustainability reports, hire senior executives 
to fill sustainability posts, and construct new buildings according to environmental 
specifications.  In addition, companies have spent increased attention on developing new 
products tailored to eco-minded customers and implementing new, environmentally 
friendly processes.  Despite the significant outflow of capital required to institute these 
environmental initiatives, it is unclear whether or not these investments have generated 
financial returns.   
II. PREVIOUS WORK 
There are a number of theories surrounding the relationship between corporate 
social performance, of which environmental performance is a large part, and firm 
performance.  Previous research on this topic has elicited inconclusive results, indicating 
that this relationship may be positive, neutral, or negative (Sánchez and Sotorrío, 2007). 
Researchers in favor of a positive correlation stress that strong environmental 
performance can enhance a firm’s reputation, improving its competitive advantage 
                                                        
1 “Climate Change: Basic Information.” Environmental Protection Agency. 20 July 2011. 
<http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/basicinfo.html>. 
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(Covin and Miles, 2000).  In addition, firms that invest in environmental initiatives may 
avoid future fines, crises, and liabilities (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996).  The reduction 
of waste associated with green activity can reduce costs and increase profitability 
(Schmidheiny, 1992).  A positive correlation could also imply that only profitable firms 
have the cash flow required for green investment (Ullman, 1985). 
Proponents of a neutral relationship between environmental and firm performance 
claim that too many factors impact social and firm performance to elicit any strong 
relationship (Sánchez and Sotorrío, 2007).   Researchers in favor of this theory attribute 
the existence of positive or negative relationships in previous studies to problems 
associated with testing this hypothesis.  Specifically, researchers have used different 
models and defined social and firm performance differently.  To complicate matters 
further, they have also analyzed different firms across different time periods (Ullman, 
1985). 
Environmental performance may be negatively correlated with firm performance 
because of the higher costs associated with investing in and maintaining environmental 
programs (Sánchez and Sotorrío, 2007; Friedman, 1970).  Furthermore, investments in 
environmental initiatives could prevent companies from undertaking more profitable 
investments (Palmer, Oates, & Portney, 1995). 
III. THE TRADE OFF ON GOING GREEN: WEIGHING THE PLUSES AND 
MINUSES 
 Although previous research has produced discordant results regarding the 
relationship between environmental and firm performance, this paper will argue that 
these two factors are negatively correlated, both due to greening’s high price tag and due 
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to the pattern of its financial returns.  Going green forces companies to make a crucial 
trade off.  Corporate greening can produce economic benefits in the form of waste 
reduction, crisis prevention, and reputation enhancement, but these advantages are offset 
by the higher cost of undertaking and maintaining environmental initiatives.  It can be 
difficult to determine if the economic benefits of corporate greening outweigh its high 
cost because green investments are typically accompanied by large initial outflows of 
capital and less quantifiable returns in the future.  This paper will argue that the market 
will not reward companies making large investments now in the hopes of enjoying 
unquantifiable payoffs in the future.  On average, firms investing in environmental 
activities will experience negative returns. 
 The relationship between environmental and firm performance is not stable across 
time.  Rather, it is likely to vary based on the amount of pressure a firm faces to go green 
and the quality of the firm’s environmental investment options.  Increased public pressure 
could lead firms to overestimate the benefits and underestimate the costs of greening in 
order to justify their investments.  Additionally, companies that have dedicated a large 
portion of their budgets to greening may be required to invest in environmental projects, 
regardless of their quality.  As time goes on and the best green projects are undertaken, 
companies may begin investing in second-tier projects with less attractive returns.  
Increased public pressure, coupled with a lack of attractive investment opportunities, 
could make the costs of greening outweigh the benefits.  
 The relationship between environmental and firm performance is likely to vary 
based on the type of company engaging in green activity, as well, since differences in 
firms alter the trade off inherent in green investment.  Specifically, firms in customer 
35 
 
facing industries are likely to experience larger benefits from reputation enhancement 
while firms in manufacturing industries are likely to experience larger benefits from 
waste reduction and crisis prevention.  This paper will attempt to identify which type of 
benefit is more likely to outweigh the high costs of greening.  Firms facing different tax 
rates are also likely to experience differing degrees of green benefits.  Environmental tax 
credits are much more enticing for firms facing higher tax rates than lower tax rates, a 
fact that could induce high tax rate firms to invest in poorer environmental projects.  
However, environmental tax subsidies for companies that operate in high tax rate 
industries are more likely to generate significant financial benefits.  On a more granular 
level, the relationship between environmental and firm performance could vary by a 
number of firm-specific factors, such as firm size, shareholder power, and profitability.  
These factors are all likely to influence the trade off associated with greening.   
 The relationship between environmental and firm performance is also likely to 
vary based on the type of environmental investment being made.  Announcements of 
active green investment, such as the launch of a new environmentally friendly product or 
process, are typically accompanied by large initial outflows of capital.  As discussed 
earlier, it is difficult to conduct a detailed cost benefit analysis on these investments, 
since future payoffs are less concrete.  On the other hand, announcements of passive 
green activity, such as the receipt of an environmental award or the launch of an 
environmental strategy, are even more ambiguous.  Although this type of green activity 
does not typically require an immediate outflow of capital, it indicates the presence of 
both past and future environmental commitments.  However, it is likely that active green 
activity will lead to larger negative returns, on average, than passive green activity 
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because more concrete capital outflows represent stronger commitments to the 
environment. 
IV. HYPOTHESES 
This paper will attempt to prove that there is a negative correlation between 
environmental performance and firm performance, as measured by abnormal stock 
returns.  The advantages of an enhanced reputation, liability avoidance, and waste 
minimization, are outweighed by the disadvantages of increased operational costs and 
limited investment opportunities that result from environmental investment. 
H1: Corporate environmental investment, determined by the announcement of a new, 
green initiative, affects firm performance.  In particular, the announcement of a green 
initiative will result in negative abnormal stock returns. 
This basic hypothesis can be extended to determine if the market’s attitude 
towards environmental investment has changed over time.  Green activity is much more 
commonplace now than it has been in the past.  As companies feel pressure to increase 
their green budgets, they may begin to invest in less desirable environmental projects.  
Cumulative stock returns may also be influenced by the proliferation of environmental 
news in the press.  Historic Google trend data for the terms “global warming” and 
“carbon emissions” will be factored into this study to account for variation in the amount 
of environmental news in the popular press. 
H2: The relationship between environmental and firm performance has changed over 
time. Specifically, more recent announcements of environmental activity will be 
accompanied by larger negative abnormal stock returns than older announcements.  
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Cumulative stock returns will also be correlated to the amount of environmental news 
in the press. 
This paper will attempt to prove that the strength of the relationship between 
environmental and firm performance varies across industries, as well.  Environmental 
investment in historically ‘dirty’ industries, such as petroleum, may be treated with 
skepticism; however, firms in these industries are more likely to benefit from “resource 
conservation, crisis prevention, and the establishment of new competitive barriers” 
(Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996).  Firms operating in ‘dirty industries,’ generally referred 
to as non-customer facing industries in this paper, are more likely to benefit from green 
investment because their operations tend to have a larger impact on the environment.  On 
the other hand, firms operating in customer-facing industries are more likely to enjoy the 
reputation benefits associated with increased environmental performance. 
Cumulative stock returns may also vary by industry due to differing tax rates 
across industries.  Firms that operate in industries with higher average tax rates will 
benefit more from government subsidies for environmental investment.  The desire to 
gain tax subsidies may induce firms with high effective tax rates to invest in unprofitable 
environmental projects.   
H3: The effect of corporate environmental investment on firm performance varies by 
industry.  The degree of abnormal stock returns will differ between companies that 
operate in non-customer facing industries and those that operate in customer-facing 
industries.  Cumulative stock returns will also be correlated to firms’ effective tax rates. 
This paper will also attempt to prove that the strength of the relationship between 
environmental and firm performance will vary based on the type of green activity a firm 
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engages in.  Environmental investments that require an outflow of capital, such as the 
launch of a new product of the implementation of a new process, will generate larger 
negative abnormal returns than announcements that are not accompanied by outflows of 
capital.  The market will penalize active press releases, those accompanied by capital 
outflows, more aggressively than passive releases because they display a stronger, more 
tangible commitment to the environment. 
H4: Announcements of active green investment, such as the development of a new 
product or process, will generate larger negative abnormal returns than 
announcements of passive green investment, such as the receipt of a green award or 
the disclosure of a new, environmental strategy. 
Lastly, this paper will attempt to demonstrate that cumulative stock returns are 
correlated to firm-specific factors, namely size, shareholder power, profitability, and 
effective tax rate. 
Larger firms are more likely to invest in environmental initiatives because they 
are under more public scrutiny (Stanwick and Stanwick, 1998).  In fact, larger firms have 
historically scored higher on Fortune’s Corporate Reputation Index (Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1990).  Larger firms, under pressure to maintain their strong environmental 
reputation, may be more likely to invest in unprofitable green initiatives.  Trailing 12-
month revenues, as of the most recent fiscal year end, will be as a proxy for firm size 
while trading volume, as of the most recent fiscal year end, will be used as a proxy for 
public interest. 
Large degrees of stakeholder power will increase environmental investment 
because companies are more likely to respond to the desires of stakeholders when power 
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is consolidated.  For this reason, as stakeholder power increases, environmental 
investment will also increase (Ullman, 1985).  Conversely, when shareholder power is 
consolidated amongst insiders, companies are less likely to invest in unprofitable 
environmental projects solely to appease their shareholders.  Percentages of insider 
holdings, as of the most recent fiscal year end, will be used to measure the relative power 
of insiders. 
More profitable firms are able to devote more attention to environmental 
initiatives.  In addition, they are able to spend the money required to institute and 
maintain costly environmental programs (Ullman, 1985).  More profitable firms also 
have a history of choosing profitable projects.  They are less likely to undertake an 
unprofitable environmental investment due to public or shareholder pressures.  For the 
purpose of this paper, return on capital, as of the most recent fiscal year end, will be used 
as a measure of firm profitability.  
Tax subsidies are an important factor in corporate environmental investment 
decisions.  Federal, state, and local tax credits are available to firms that invest in green 
initiatives.  Companies with high tax rates may be more willing to institute unprofitable 
environmental initiatives in order to receive tax subsidies than companies with lower tax 
rates.  Effective tax rates, as of the most recent fiscal year end, will be used to measure 
firm-specific tax levels.   
H5: Cumulative stock returns will be correlated to firm size, shareholder power, 
profitability, and the effective tax rate.  As firm size and the effective tax rate increase, 
cumulative stock returns will also increase.  As firm profitability and insider holdings 
increase, cumulative stock returns will decrease. 
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V. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This paper relies on event study methodology to determine the relationship 
between environmental and firm performance.  Event study methodology was used to 
extract the portion of stock returns that could be attributed to firm-specific events, namely 
the release of an announcement detailing environmental activity, rather than to changes in 
the market as a whole. 
Press releases outlining green activity were used to measure environmental 
performance.  These press releases could be broadly categorized as announcing 1) the 
launch of a new eco-friendly product, 2) the introduction of a new eco-friendly process, 
3) the receipt of an environmental award, and 4) the communication of eco-friendly goals 
and strategies.  Cumulative stock returns served as a measure of firm performance.   
The release date of the announcement was treated as the event date.  Cumulative 
stock returns, cumulative market returns, and cumulative risk free rates were calculated 
for the period beginning 2 days before the event date and ending 3 days after the event 
date. Bloomberg equity pricing data was used to calculate cumulative stock returns, S&P 
returns were used to calculate cumulative market returns, and Ken French’s database, 
which amasses data from Ibbotson and Associates, Inc., was used to calculate cumulative 
risk-free rates.2  The cumulative stock return, net of the cumulative risk free rate, was 
regressed against the cumulative market return, net of the risk free rate, in order to 
determine an alpha, or the amount of excess return that cannot be attributed to the market.  
This data was then segmented by year, industry, and type of press release for hypotheses 
2 – 4. 
                                                        
2 Kenneth French. “Fama/French Factors.” 12 Dec 2011. 
<http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#Research>. 
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A multivariate regression was used to analyze the relationship between 
cumulative stock returns and independent, firm-specific variables, such as trailing 12-
month revenue, trading volume, percentage of insider holdings, return on capital, and 
effective tax rate.  These independent variables were obtained from Value Line.  The 
effective tax rate and percent changes in weekly Google trend data for the terms “global 
warming” and “carbon emissions” were used as independent variables in additional 
regressions.  
VI. DATA SELECTION 
The data set consisted of 619 environmental press releases.  It was comprised of 
155 unique US-based publicly traded companies across 10 industries from 2006 to 2011.  
The data set is summarized below.   
Figure 1: Data Segmentation by Industry and Year 
 
  
 
 
 
 
A subset of the original data set was used to analyze the relationship between 
cumulative stock returns and independent, firm-specific variables.   This data set 
consisted of 346 environmental press releases.  It was comprised of 111 unique US-based 
publicly traded companies across 10 industries from 2006 to 2010.  The data set is 
summarized below.   
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Figure 2: Data Segmentation by Industry and Year, Subset 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII. RESULTS 
H1: The regression indicated a negative, albeit statistically weak, relationship 
between environmental performance and firm performance.  The regression yielded an 
alpha, or excess return not attributable to the market, equal to -0.003 with a p-value of 
0.151 (see Exhibit 1).  
H2: Abnormal returns declined from 0.007 in 2007 to -0.013 in 2008 and from -
0.004 in 2010 to -0.007 in 2011.  The regression did not yield a significant alpha for 2006 
or 2009. Subsequent regressions did not yield significant alphas for the periods 2006 – 
2008 or 2009 – 2011 (see Exhibit 2). 
 
Figure 3: Regression Results: Segmentation by Year 
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As the graph below shows, there is no relationship between the year in which an 
environmental initiative is announced and the degree of abnormal returns.   
Figure 4: Regression Coefficients and P-Values by Year 
 
There also appears to be no relationship between the level of public concern for 
the environment, as measured by changes in weekly Google trend data for the terms 
“global warming” and “carbon emissions,” and abnormal returns (see Exhibit 3).  Both 
independent variables were not statistically significant. 
Figure 5: Regression Results: “Global Warming” and “Carbon Emissions” 
 
H3:  On the other hand, there does appear to be a strong relationship between the 
type of environmental announcement and the presence of abnormal returns.  While active 
press releases, those announcing a new environmental product or process, did not exhibit 
a significant abnormal return, passive press releases, those announcing a new 
environmental goal or award, did exhibit a significant abnormal return.  In fact, the 
passive regression yiedled an alpha of -0.008 with a p-value of 0.015 (see Exhibit 4).    
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Figure 6: Regression Results: Active and Passive 
 
  
 
H4:  The type of industry a firm operates in is also related to the presence of 
abnormal stock returns.  Customer facing industries, defined in this paper as consumer 
discretionary, consumer staples, information technology, health care, financials, and 
telecommunication services, did not exhibit abnormal returns.  However, environmental 
press releases of non-customer facing industries, defined in this paper as industrials, 
materials, utilities, and energy, were met with significant abnormal returns (see Exhibit 
5).  The non-customer facing regression yielded an alpha of -0.009 with a p-value of 
0.043 (see Exhibit 6).   
Figure 7: Regression Results: “Customer-Facing” and “Non-Customer Facing” 
 
There is also a strong statistical relationship between the effective tax rate of a 
firm and cumulative stock returns.  Effective tax rate was a significant independent 
variable with a coefficient of 0.061 and a p-value of 0.028 (see Exhibit 7).   
H5: A multivariate regression with the independent variables trading volume, 
trailing 12-month revenues, return on capital, effective tax rate, and insider holdings did 
not yield any strong statistical relationships.  However, return on capital is a weakly 
significant variable with a coefficient of 0.032 and a p-value of 0.112.  This variable is 
positively correlated with cumulative stock returns (see Exhibits 8 and 9). 
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Figure 8: Multivariate Regression Results 
 
VIII. ANALYSIS 
 
Why do firms continue to invest in green initiatives if the market does not decidedly 
value these activities?  It is unlikely that companies pursue environmental investment for 
purely altruistic reasons.  Rather, firms may be overestimating the advantages of 
greening, such as waste reduction and reputation enhancement.  Companies may also be 
investing in green activities to avoid the financial fall out that could occur from 
environmental liabilities or crises.  The cost associated with maintaining environmental 
infrastructure may be less than the costs associated with responding to an environmental 
crisis.  In fact, previous research has indicated that environmental crises decrease firm 
valuation by an average $390 million, or $0.70 per share (Klassen and McLaughlin, 
1996).  Subsequent studies can test this hypothesis by evaluating the degree of 
cumulative abnormal returns associated with announcements of green investment in 
addition to those associated with incidents of environmental crises. 
The relationship between environmental and firm performance may appear weak 
because the market is judging press releases on an individual basis.  Put simply, the 
market may respond to a press release positively or negatively, based on the financial 
implications of each announcement.  This hypothesis is corroborated by the fact that 
abnormal returns vary according to the type of announcement made.  Active 
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announcements do not exhibit a significant cumulative abnormal return, while passive 
investments do.  This could indicate that the market evaluates active press releases based 
on the NPV of the particular project being announced.  Since passive releases tend to 
announce general green behavior rather than specific green projects, the market is unable 
to evaluate the financial implications of these activities.  It views nonspecific 
environmental investment in a negative light. Additionally, the insignificance of firm-
specific factors in the relationship between environmental and firm performance, 
indicates that the market is more concerned with the content of the actual announcement 
than firm-level attributes.  This analysis suggests that companies should dedicate their 
environmental budget to concrete, NPV positive projects rather than broad, overarching 
environmental behavior.   
Differing market perceptions regarding environmental investment across industries 
farther complicate the relationship between environmental and firm performance.  
Investments in environmental initiatives by firms operating in non-customer facing 
industries exhibit negative cumulative abnormal returns, while investments by firms 
operating in customer facing industries do not.  These results confirm that environmental 
investment can enhance a firm’s reputation in the eyes of its customers, a factor that is 
especially meaningful in customer-facing industries. Consumers in business-to-customer 
relationships are more likely to be altruistically motivated to reduce their carbon footprint 
than consumers in business-to-business relationships.  Reputation benefits can lead to a 
competitive advantage and, ultimately, improved financial performance (Covin and 
Miles, 2000).  Going forward, it would be interesting to research a potential relationship 
between the income level of end-consumers and cumulative abnormal returns.  Firms that 
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cater to affluent customers may be able to easily pass on the higher costs associated with 
green activity in the form of higher prices.  If this is true, these companies are less likely 
to experience negative abnormal returns.   
There is a significant positive relationship between a firm’s effective tax rate and its 
cumulative stock return.  This signals that higher tax rates are associated with higher 
cumulative returns.  The average effective tax rate of non-customer facing firms is 
29.0%, compared with 26.9% for customer-facing firms.  These differing tax rates could 
also help explain variation in cumulative abnormal return across industries.  A higher tax 
rate could induce non-customer facing firms to invest in poor environmental projects, 
purely for tax subsidization.  Since tax credits are an important consideration in 
environmental investing, subsequent research could investigate whether market attitudes 
towards environmental investment have changed along with changes in the tax code.  As 
we stand today, environmental tax credits are not large enough to make the majority of 
green investment economically attractive.  However, it may be possible to adjust the tax 
code to encourage more environmental spend, while simultaneously producing more 
NPV positive investments.   
Additionally, there was no discernible pattern to the degree of abnormal returns over 
time, a fact that indicates market perceptions towards environmental investment have not 
changed significantly from 2006 – 2011.   Furthermore, the level of environmental 
coverage in the press has not played a large role in how the market judges environmental 
activity.  Subsequent research could evaluate press releases over a broader time period to 
determine if changes in market perceptions occur more slowly.  A broader time period 
may also convey a more meaningful relationship between changes in environmental press 
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coverage and environmental spend.  It would be interesting to segment this broader data 
set by type of press release, by industry, and by year to determine if market perceptions 
have changed on a more granular level.   
IX. SUMMARY 
This paper focuses on the relationship between corporate environmental performance, 
as measured by press releases announcing environmental activity, and firm performance, 
as measured by abnormal stock returns.  This paper concludes that there is not a strong 
statistical relationship between environmental and firm performance.  Furthermore, it 
does not appear that market attitudes towards green investment have changed over time 
or that firm-specific variables influence abnormal returns.  Although there is not a strong 
statistical relationship between all of the press releases studied and abnormal stock 
returns, there are statistically significant relationships in subsets of the data.  In particular, 
passive press releases and releases for firms in non-customer facing industries exhibit 
negative cumulative abnormal returns.  Additionally, effective tax rate is a statistically 
significant independent variable positively correlated with cumulative stock returns.   
This paper suggests that the weak relationship between firm and environmental 
performance is partially due to variance in market reactions across press releases and 
industries.  It appears that the market reacts to active press releases, those announcing 
identifiable investments, based on the financial merit of those individual projects.  
However, passive press releases, which cannot be judged according to this same metric, 
are viewed in a negative light.  The market also judges press releases differently based on 
the type of industry a firm operates in.  Firms in customer facing industries are less likely 
to experience negative abnormal returns because their reputation is enhanced by 
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investments in environmental initiatives. Non-customer facing industries do not reap this 
same benefit.  Their announcements are accompanied by negative cumulative abnormal 
returns.   
This paper also suggests areas for further research.   Subsequent studies could utilize 
a larger data set that includes both environmentally positive and negative announcements.  
A broader data set could also be used to evaluate press releases over a longer time period.  
Lastly, future research could attempt to identify relationships between cumulative 
abnormal returns and consumer income levels or tax code changes. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Exhibit 1: Regression of All Press Releases 
 
 
 
Exhibit 2: Regressions of Press Releases Segmented by Year 
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Exhibit 3: Regressions of Press Releases with the Independent Variables “Carbon 
Emissions” and “Global Warming” 
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Exhibit 4: Regressions of Press Releases Segmented by Type of Press Release 
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Exhibit 5: Industry Segmentation 
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 Exhibit 6: Regressions of Press Releases Segmented by Type of Industry 
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Exhibit 7: Regressions of Press Releases with the Independent Variable Effective 
Tax Rate 
 
 
Exhibit 8: Multivariate Correlation Matrix
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Exhibit 9: Regression of Press Releases with the Independent Variables Trading 
Volume, Trailing 12-month Revenues, Return on Capital, Effective Tax Rate, and 
Insider Holdings 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The marketplace for private company shares has evolved rapidly over the last few years 
in response to changing market dynamics and increasing interest in the next generation of large 
Internet-based companies.  This paper provides an overview of the evolution of the private 
company secondary marketplace in the United States, its current players, and the risks and 
benefits to those involved.  The paper then discusses several companies that have transitioned 
from secondary market transactions to initial public offerings (IPOs).  Finally, this paper 
evaluates the ability of secondary market data to predict share price changes post IPO. 
 
II. EVOLUTION OF THE MARKETPLACE 
A wave of companies is vying for a role in the secondary marketplace for private 
company shares.  Until recently, trading platforms were limited to institutional buyers and most 
transactions were conducted largely on an ad-hoc basis.
1
  Secondary interests in private company 
shares could be acquired through investment funds or on an individual basis.
2
  Shares could be 
purchased directly from founders, employees, angel investors or general partners of older vintage 
venture capital funds seeking liquidity.
3
   Alternatively, shares could be acquired indirectly, for 
example, in the form of limited partnership interests.
4
   
                                                             
1 Jose Miguel Mendoza and Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The 'New' Venture Capital Cycle (Part I): The Importance of 
Private Secondary Market Liquidity, Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law & Economics Working Paper No. 1/2011 
(May 3, 2011).  Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1829835. 
2 Id. 
3 Hans Swildens, Venture Capital Secondary Funds – The Third Exit Option: A smart way to improve fund 
performance and unlock hidden value, Industry Ventures LLC White Paper (May 2008).  Available at: 
http://www.industryventures.com/pdf/Venture_Capital_Secondaries_White_Paper.pdf.  
4 Id. 
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In 1990, Nasdaq launched PORTAL (Private Offerings, Resales, and Trading through 
Automated Linkages) as a private institutional marketplace for 144A securities.
5
 144A is a safe 
harbor that provides qualified institutional buyers with an exemption from the registration 
requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act.
6
  A web-based version of PORTAL was 
approved by the SEC on July 31, 2007 and began operating on August 15, 2007.
7,8
  At roughly 
the same time, several investment banks launched their own trading systems.  Goldman Sachs 
launched its GSTrUE (Tradable Unregistered Equity) system in May, 2007.
 9,10
  A group of five 
Wall Street firms (Citigroup, Bank of New York Mellon, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and 
Morgan Stanley) formed OPUS-5 (Open Platform for Unregistered Securities) in August 2007 
and were later joined by Bank of America, Credit Suisse, and UBS.
11
  Several other firms, 
including JPMorgan Chase and Bear Sterns, launched their own platforms.
12
 
In November 2007, Nasdaq and twelve Wall Street firms announced the Portal 
Alliance.
13,14
  The alliance formed to merge several different 144A platforms (including 
                                                             
5 Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a 
Proposed Rule Change to Eliminate Rules Related to Nasdaq’s PORTAL Market, Securities and Exchange 
Commission (Release No. 34-60991; File No. SR-NASDAQ-2009-092) (November 12, 2009).  Available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasdaq/2009/34-60991.pdf. 
6 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2012). 
7 Order Granting The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC’s Application for an Exemption Pursuant to Section 36 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Securities and Exchange Commission (Release No. 34-56176) (July 31, 2007).  
Available at: http://www.sec.gov/rules/exorders/2007/34-56176.pdf. 
8
 NASDAQ's Electronic Trading Platform for the 144A Private Placement Market is Approved by the SEC: The 
PORTAL Market Trading System Will Begin Operating On August 15, The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. Press Release  
(August 1, 2007).  Available at: http://ir.nasdaqomx.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=257543.  
9
 Arleen Jacobius, Slow start, great hope for Nasdaq private exchange: Pensions & Investments, SecondMarket 
(January 14, 2010).  Available at: https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/news/slow-start-great-hope-for-
nasdaq-private-exchange. 
10 Gregory Zuckerman, A Hot Idea Falls Short at Goldman, WSJ.com (April 7, 2011).  Available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704587004576245101094450490.html. 
11
 Elena Schwieger, Comment, Redefining the Private Placement Market After Sarbanes-Oxley: Nasdaq's 
Portal and Rule 144A, 57 Cath. U. L. Rev. 885 (2008). 
12 Id. 
13About the PORTAL Alliance, Available at: http://www.portalalliancemarket.com/about_pa_content.aspx. 
14 Anupreeta Das, Nasdaq, Wall St Firms Join Forces for 144a Market, Reuters (November 12, 2007).  Available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/11/12/sppage012-n12453209-oisbn-idUSN1245320920071112.  The initial 
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GsTRUE and OPUS-5).
15
  The financial difficulties of several of the firms involved, including 
Lehman Brothers and Bear Sterns, delayed the launch until September 2009 when nine banks 
agreed to list 144A or private company transactions.
16 
Another marketplace, NYPPEX, has been active in the secondary private markets since 
1998.
17
  According to the firm, they are “one of the world's leading private equity secondary 
intermediaries for single interest transactions having a minimum size of $100,000 up to $10 
million [and]… help founders, key employees and individual investors achieve superior 
transaction speed and price execution, with minimal market impact.” 18  The investment bank 
Friedman Billings Ramsey also entered the 144A transaction space in 1997 and, according to the 
firm, “has since been the dominant firm in the Rule 144A equity market. In the last ten years, the 
firm has completed nearly 10 times as many 144A transactions and raised nearly 10 times as 
much capital via these transactions as any other investment bank.”19 
While the 144A market has been successful in supporting larger transactions, the focus 
on institutional investors resulted in very limited acceptance for smaller offerings, including 
those of venture-backed companies.
20,21,22
  Grant Thorton hypothesizes that the absence of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
twelve firms were:  Bank of America, Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, 
JPMorgan, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, UBS, and Wachovia. 
15
 Id. 
16
 Arleen Jacobius, Slow start, great hope for Nasdaq private exchange: Pensions & Investments, SecondMarket 
(January 14, 2010) (The nine firms were: Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse Group, Deutsche Bank AG, 
Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs Group Inc., JP Morgan Chase & Co., Morgan Stanley, UBS AG, and Wells Fargo 
Securities LLC).  Available at: https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/news/slow-start-great-hope-for-nasdaq-
private-exchange. 
17
 Our Company, NYPPEX Private Markets, http://nyppex.com/company.php (2011). 
18 Brokerage, NYPPEX Private Markets, http://nyppex.com (2011). 
19
 Our History, FBR & Co, http://www.fbr.com/Company/FBR/History.aspx. 
20
 Arleen Jacobius, Slow start, great hope for Nasdaq private exchange: Pensions & Investments, SecondMarket 
(January 14, 2010).  Available at: https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/news/slow-start-great-hope-for-
nasdaq-private-exchange. 
21 Gregory Zuckerman, A Hot Idea Falls Short at Goldman, WSJ.com (April 7, 2011).  Available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704587004576245101094450490.html. 
22Jay R. Ritter, Equilibrium in the IPO Market (April 25, 2011).  Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1822542.  
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“individual investors from the market is likely to undercut its ability to support small offerings, 
because large populations of small (retail) investors are what historically support liquidity and 
valuations in small cap stocks.”23   
 
III. CURRENT PLAYERS 
The traditional ad-hoc methods discussed in Section I continue to be the primary 
mechanism for transacting in private company shares.
24
  The ecosystem has broadened to include 
several additional avenues for the players involved.  Secondary funds, exchange funds, 
secondary marketplaces, financial firm platforms, and Nasdaq-listed companies that provide 
indirect access to private company securities are discussed below. 
a. Secondary Funds 
There are several active secondary funds, including those managed by Industry Ventures, 
Millennium Technology Value Partners, Saints Capital, and W Capital Partners.
25
  Industry 
Ventures was founded in 2000 and has secondary funds that invest in venture-backed company 
shares by purchasing shares directly from founders, employees, investors, and general partners or 
by acquiring limited partnership interests.
26,27
  Investments have included interests in Pandora, 
                                                             
23
 David Weild and Edward Kim, Why are IPOs in the ICU?, Grant Thornton White Paper.  Available at: 
http://www.gt.com/staticfiles/GTCom/files/GT%20Thinking/IPO%20white%20paper/Why%20are%20IPOs%20in%2
0the%20ICU_11_19.pdf. 
24
 Chris Kelley, Panel – Private Company Stock Market – Friend or Foe?, SecondMarket Capitalyze 2011 Conference, 
San Francisco. (May 11, 2011).  Video available at: https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/capitalyze. 
25Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, University of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
1137 (October 7, 2010). Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1688982. 
26 Focusing on Inefficiencies in Venture Capital, Industry Ventures, http://www.industryventures.com/home.html. 
27 Founders, Management & Early Investors, Industry Ventures, http://www.industryventures.com/founders_early 
_investors.html. 
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Facebook, and Twitter.
28
  In July 2011, Industry Ventures closed its sixth secondary fund ($400 
million). 
Millennium Technology Value Partners develops alternative liquidity programs in 
partnership with venture-backed companies.
29,30
  It launched its current strategy in 2002 and 
closed its most recent fund ($280 million) in April 2010.
31,32
  Investments have been made in 
over 300 companies including Facebook, Twitter, and Zappos.
33
  Saints Capital launched in 2000 
and provides liquidity for private company investors through customized transactions.
 34
  Saints 
Capital has invested in high-growth industries such as software, internet, healthcare and business 
services.
35
  W Capital Partners was formed in 2001 and provides secondary liquidity in several 
categories including growth and venture capital.
 36, 37
  Investments include Internet, 
communications and infrastructure, life sciences, and software and services companies.
38
 
b. Exchange clubs 
Several creative alternatives have developed to satisfy the need for liquidity in smaller 
secondary offerings.  In December 2009 in London and October 2010 in the United States, the 
Founders Club was launched to allow company founders to swap part of their future income 
                                                             
28 Sam Sutton, Industry Ventures raises $400m for secondaries: The San Francisco secondaries firm exceeded its 
sixth fund’s $300m target by attracting new LPs and re-ups, Private Equity International (July 11, 2011). 
Available at: http://www.industryventures.com/pdf/PEI62068.pdf. 
29
 Overview, Millennium Technology Value Partners, http://mtvlp.com/overview (2012). 
30
 Dan Burstein, Panel - Secondary Transaction Mechanics and Primer, SecondMarket Capitalyze 2012 Conference, 
New York (February 15, 2012).  Video available at: https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/event-replay-
capitalyze-east. 
31
 Millennium Technology Value Partners, CrunchBase, http://www.crunchbase.com/financial-
organization/millennium-technology-ventures. 
32
 Millennium Technology Value Partners II, L.P. Closes on $280 Million for New Fund, Millennium Technology Value 
Partners Selected Highlights of Media Coverage, http://www.mtvlp.com/files/news/Media%20Coverage%202010% 
20Press%20Release.pdf (April 2010). 
33
 Overview, Millennium Technology Value Partners, http://mtvlp.com/overview (2012). 
34 Overview, Saints VC, http://www.saintsvc.com/about/overview (2012). 
35 Id. 
36 W Capital Partners, http://wcapgroup.com (2011). 
37 All Investments, W Capital Partners, http://wcapgroup.com/PortfolioCompanies/tabid/59/Default.aspx (2011). 
38 Id. 
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streams for ownership in the fund and the potential for more immediate liquidity than their 
individual companies could provide.
39,40
  Entrex’s “TIGRcub™” structure offers a similar 
service that provides “Investors with monthly income, liquidity and investment returns that are 
not based on exit events, or exposed to the volatility of the equity capital markets—all while 
providing Issuers a non-dilutive capital solution with risk-adjusted pricing simulating either debt 
or equity structures.”41  
c. Marketplaces 
i. SecondMarket 
 SecondMarket, which initially provided a liquidity solution for restricted securities in 
public companies, began transacting in private company shares in 2008 and launched its private 
company marketplace in mid-2009. 
42
  The popularity of Facebook and its early presence in the 
marketplace has created significant positive publicity for SecondMarket.
43
  SecondMarket 
completed $558 million in private company transactions in 2011 (a 55% increase from the 
previous year) and over $1 billion since 2008.
44
  Nearly 15,000 accredited investors are on the 
platform with over $6 billion in indications of interest in 2011.
 45
 
SecondMarket earns a fee of at least $2,500 for each completed transaction.  The fee is 
“determined on a case-by-case basis depending on many factors, including, but not limited, to 
                                                             
39
 About The Founders Club, The Founders Club, http://founders-club.com/about-the-founders-club.html. 
40
 Sell Shares for Cash, The Founders Club, http://founders-club.com/about-the-founders-club/sell-shares-for-cash-
direct-secondaries.html. 
41
 About Us, Entrex, http://www.entrex.net/about_us.shtml. 
42
 Company Overview, SecondMarket Holdings Inc., https://www.secondmarket.com/about-us?t=fl (2012). 
43 According to M. Adam Oliveri, Managing Director – Private Company Market, SecondMarket, as of February 15, 
2012, Facebook continued to generate the largest volume of transactions on SecondMarket. M. Adam Oliveri, 
Panel - The Secondary Market Big Picturer, SecondMarket Capitalyze 2012 Conference, New York (February 15, 
2012).  Video available at: https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/event-replay-capitalyze-east. 
44 SecondMarket’s 2011 Year End Private Company Report, SecondMarket Holdings Inc. (January 19, 2012).  
Available at: https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/reports/secondmarkets-2011-year-end-private-company-
report. 
45 Id. 
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the asset type, value of the asset, and complexity of the transaction.”46,47  The minimum 
transaction size is $100,000, which SecondMarket feels is necessary to justify the fixed costs 
involved.
48
  In addition to SecondMarket’s commission, transaction costs include an opinion 
letter of the seller’s counsel that the private placement exemption from registration applies 
($2,500 for small transactions, more for larger) and potentially transfer fees required by the 
company to cover the administrative costs of transferring shares from seller to buyer.
 49
  
Initially, SecondMarket did not require the consent of the issuer, but their model has 
evolved.  Now SecondMarket designs “customized liquidity program[s]” for the company and 
considers the company as their customer.
50,51
  Companies are allowed to determine how the 
marketplace for their shares is structured.  The companies decide who may sell to whom (e.g., only 
former employees to existing shareholders), the number of shares that can be sold, the transaction 
frequency (e.g., weekly, or, in most cases quarterly or annually), and the pricing structure (e.g., a 
negotiated one-off transaction vs. auction).
52
  Each company is audited and required to provide 
financial information to eligible buyers and sellers through a secure data room.
53
  
                                                             
46 SecondMarket Admin, How does SecondMarket make money?, SecondMarket Holdings Inc.,  
http://support.secondmarket.com/entries/351048-how-does-secondmarket-make-money (December 06, 2010). 
47
 SecondMarket Admin, Is there a minimum transaction size for buying securities through SecondMarket?, 
http://support.secondmarket.com/entries/350710-is-there-a-minimum-transaction-size-for-buying-securities-
through-secondmarket (December 06, 2010). 
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 Id. 
49
 Id. 
50
 Jeremy Smith, Presentation – A Deep Dive into Secondary Market Mechanics, SecondMarket Capitalyze 2011 
Conference, San Francisco. (May 11, 2011).  Video available at: 
https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/capitalyze. 
51 Tom Johansmeyer, The Differences Between SecondMarket and SharesPost According to Their CEOs, Business 
Insider (December 1, 2011).  Available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/the-differences-between-
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52 The Future of Capital Formation: Hearing Before the House Committee on Government and Oversight Reform, 
112th Congress (May 10, 2011) (statement of Barry Silbert, CEO, SecondMarket).  Available at: 
http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Testimony/5-10-11_Barry_Silbert_Capital_Formation_Testimony.pdf. 
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 The Future of Capital Formation: Hearing Before the House Committee on Government and Oversight Reform, 
112th Congress (May 10, 2011) (statement of Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission).    
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 Consumer web and social media transactions dominate on SecondMarket, making up 
61.4% of transactions in 2011.
 54
  Figure 1 provides a detailed breakdown of the 2011 
transactions by industry.  A typical company on the platform has at least $20 million in revenue 
and a market capitalization of $100 million, is four or more years old, has received at least Series 
B funding, and has more than fifty shareholders.
55
   
 
Figure 1
56
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55
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Institutional buyers were parties in 72.8% of the $558 million in transactions.  Figure 2 provides 
a more detailed breakdown on the type of institutional buyers on SecondMarket.   
 
Figure 2
57
 
A large majority of sellers in 2011 were ex-employees (79.3% by dollar value).  Employees 
(11.1%), investors (3.7%), founders (0.4%), and others (5.5%) make up the remainder.
 58
 
In March 2011, SecondMarket launched a “watching” feature to provide investors with a 
way of tracking companies of interest.
59
  As of January 26, 2012, there were 18,716 companies 
available for watching on SecondMarket; however, fewer than a third (6,011) had one or more 
watchers.
60
  As illustrated in Figure 3, the majority of companies have relatively few watchers.  
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Figure 3
61
 
The top ten companies watched as of January 26, 2012 were Facebook (13,296 watchers), 
Twitter (7,254), Foursquare (3,722), Dropbox (3,534), Yelp (2,929), Gilt Group (2,310), Hulu 
(2,258), Square (2,229), LivingSocial (2,178), and Craigslist (1,962).
62
 
ii. SharesPost 
SharesPost was founded in early 2009 and, per the company, connects over 86,000 
institutional and individual investors with over $1 billion worth of private company shares.
63
 
SharesPost is focused exclusively on private company transactions (SecondMarket, on the other 
hand, handles several categories of illiquid assets).  As of November 2011, SharesPost was 
handling four trades per day and had completed transactions for forty different companies in 
2011.
64
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62 Id. 
63 About Us, SharesPost Inc., https://www.sharespost.com/pages/about. 
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available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/weir-sees-explosive-growth-in-secondary-
markets/2011/11/09/gIQAjDnt6M_video.html. 
1 
10 
100 
1000 
10000 
100000 
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 o
f 
W
a
tc
h
e
r
s 
Companies 
SecondMarket Watchers 
(as of January 26, 2012) 
74 
 
SharesPost uses FINRA-registered specialists to assist in consummating transactions.  
The specialists charge a 3% commission on the transaction value (minimum of $5,000).
65
  U.S. 
Bank is available as escrow agent and charges $1,500 to both buyer and seller for each 
transaction.
66
  The minimum sales price on SharesPost is $25,000.
67
  Companies traded on 
SharesPost are usually valued at $100 million or more, have at least $10 million in revenue, and 
were founded at least 5 years ago.
68
 
Unlike SecondMarket, SharesPost does not require the involvement of the company 
whose shares are transacted.  Companies that choose to be involved are able to control who buys 
(e.g. only institutional buyers or certain individuals) and who sells, when transactions occur, and 
under what terms.
69
 
 SharesPost does not provide reports summarizing the types of companies transacted on its 
platform.  However, based on the data that is provided, SharesPost hosts a large number of 
cleantech/energy transactions.  On January 26, 2012, there were 23 companies with buy or sell 
offers available on SharesPost.  SharesPost categorizes the companies as cleantech/energy (5 
listed), consumer (3), software (3), enterprise (2), retail (2), web (2), financial services (2), social 
(2), advertising & marketing (1), biotech (1), healthcare (0), media & online content (0), and 
telecom/hardware (0).  Facebook is the most commonly traded company on SharesPost.  There 
have been over 200 Facebook transactions since August 20, 2009.
70
   
 In addition to providing transaction data via its website and Bloomberg terminals, 
SharesPost has made efforts to provide additional information and transparency through its 
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“SharesPost Venture-Backed Index” and research reports.  The index aggregates transaction 
data, current posts on the marketplace, and research-based valuation estimates for seven 
companies.
71
  The index provides some basis for determining trends in the secondary 
marketplace for private company shares.  SharesPost also makes available a large number of 
research reports, which typically include an overview of the company’s products, markets, and 
competitors, financial information, forecasts, and valuations.
72
  These reports are designed to 
assist buyers and sellers with their investment decisions (with disclaimers).  However, questions 
have been raised regarding the independence of these reports.
73
  Significant potential issues 
remain with the level of information provided on all the secondary markets. 
iii. Xpert Financial 
Xpert Financial was founded in early 2009 with the support of well-known venture 
capitalist Tim Draper, who is chairman of the company’s board.74,75  Xpert Financial has not 
disclosed information on its transactions to the extent of SharesPost or SecondMarket and more 
tightly controls login access to its site (which is limited to shareholders, companies, accredited 
investors, and qualified institutional buyers).
76,77
 
Xpert Financial uses a registered broker-dealer subsidiary, Xpert Securities, to provide an 
online trading platform called Xpert ATS for transacting in private company shares.
78
  The 
platform supports both primary offerings and secondary trading.  Shares are sold through either a 
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fixed-price offering or a modified Dutch auction.
79
  Xpert Financial indicates that by using its 
“auto-execution technology”, transactions can settle and clear in days rather than the weeks or 
months previously necessary.
80
  Companies are given control over the market for their shares, 
including who can sell and who can buy.
81
  However, according to a February 3, 2012 Wall 
Street Journal article, Xpert Financial may have shifted its focus away from secondary 
transactions and towards primary.
82
  A subsequent Xpert Financial press release appears to have 
confirmed this shift; all of the examples of companies using its platform focused on primary 
capital raises (with exception of one that included a purchase from an existing rights holder in 
conjunction with a primary raise).83 
d. Recent Entrants 
In 2011, several firms announced their plans to provide platforms for trading private 
company shares.  These efforts are likely in response to the success demonstrated by 
SecondMarket and SharesPost.  However, unlike SecondMarket and SharesPost, most of these 
new entrants are focused solely on institutional investors (with the exception of Wedbush 
Securities and Gate Technologies, which also service accredited individuals).   
In February 2011, Gate Technologies announced the purchase of InfoExchange as a 
means for providing improved investment research to customers and an aid in its competition 
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with SecondMarket and Sharespost.
84
  Gate Technologies hoped to centralize transactions 
through its electronic platform.  However, a recent Wall Street Journal article indicates the 
company has had difficulty gaining traction.
 85,86
  Also in February, Mission Markets, a social 
impact investment firm, announced its first secondary offering of private company stock.
87
 
In October 2011, Cantor Fitzgerald, a financial services firm, announced that it was 
forming the Cantor Private Markets Group to offer clients the opportunity to invest in private 
company stock (as well as REITs and private equity and hedge fund interests).
88
  Liquidnet, a 
global institutional trading network, also announced in October 2011 that it was entering “the 
fast-growing market in private-company shares trading.”89  Liquidnet indicated that it will focus 
on large institutional investors seeking access to high-growth companies and will work directly 
with private companies to establish liquidity programs.
90
  However, the executive hired to run 
Liquidnet’s private company program resigned after just three months raising questions about the 
status of their program.
91
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On December 1, 2011, Wedbush Securities, a full-service investment firm, announced the 
expansion of its Private Shares Group, which focuses on the social media space.
92
  Wedbush 
creates tailored programs that allow existing and former employees, venture capitalists, private 
equity, and other investors to sell their shares.
 93
  Services are offered to both institutional and 
accredited investors.
 94
  Also in early December, the brokerage firm GFI Group announced that it 
launched a private shares group and will focus on the institutional side of the market.
95
  Later in 
December, Knight Capital Group, a global financial services firm, announced that it had 
established a relationship with GreenCrest Capital Management, a research firm, to improve its 
ability to offer institutional clients access to trading in private companies.
 96
 
e. Opportunities for Unaccredited Investors 
The secondary market ecosystem has broadened to allow unaccredited investors an 
opportunity to invest indirectly.  Unaccredited investors have access through a layer of 
professional investors.
97
  For example, GSV Capital Corp. formed in September 2010 “as an 
externally managed, non-diversified closed-end management investment company”, had its 
initial public offering on May 3, 2011, and now trades on Nasdaq (GSVC).
98
  GSV Capital 
invests primarily in shares of private companies.  GSVC Capital’s January 6, 2012 Form N-2 
lists the following companies in its portfolio: Bloom Energy, Chegg, Control 4, DreamBox 
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Learning, DropBox, Facebook, Gilt Groupe, Grockit, Groupon, Kno, debt tied to the value of 
Zynga, Serious Energy, SharesPost, Silver Spring Networks, StormWind, The EchoSystem, The 
rSmart Group, TrueCar, Twitter, ZocDoc, and Zoom Systems.  GSVC’s share price has remained 
relatively stable since its IPO (see Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4
99
 
 In December 2011, Keating Capital also began trading on Nasdaq (KIPO).
100
 Keating is a 
business development company focusing on pre-IPO investments in high growth companies.
101
  
Figure 5 illustrates the sectors and companies in which Keating Capital has invested.  It has more 
recently invested in private companies Zoosk and Agilyx.
102,103
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Figure 5 (source: Keating Capital, Inc.)
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IV. MARKETPLACE RISKS AND BENEFITS 
The rapid growth in secondary markets for private company shares is due in large part to 
the benefits available to both buyers and sellers.  Secondary transactions can provide liquidity for 
shareholders at a time when the issuer is not ready for an exit.  Buyers gain access to an 
alternative investment class.  The benefits to both buyers and sellers, as well as the risks and 
benefits to the issuer, are discussed below. 
a. Sellers 
The liquidity needs of founders and employees are often not aligned with a company’s 
needs.  Personal situations, a desire for diversification, changes in employment, tax 
considerations and many other factors impact individuals in unique ways.
105
  Sale through a 
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secondary market allows individuals to secure the liquidity they need regardless of the issuer’s 
particular needs at that time.  This interim liquidity reduces the risk for the entrepreneurs and 
allows them to focus on growing the company, rather than personal financial issues.
106
 
The liquidity needs of venture capitalists also often differ from those of the issuer.  Older 
vintage funds may wish to wind down their investments and return capital to their limited 
partners.
107,108
  Early stage venture capitalists may seek to exit from larger companies so they can 
focus on earlier stage companies where they provide more value add.
 109
  A fund may have 
insufficient reserves for a follow-on round and can sell to an investor with the capacity to make 
the additional investment.
110
  A venture capitalist may disagree with a board’s strategic direction 
or the fund’s area of focus may have shifted.111   
b.  Buyers 
Buyers in the secondary markets benefit from access to investments that might not 
otherwise be available to them.  Existing investors may wish to increase their stake in a 
company.
112
  New investors may desire access that was not available in primary rounds.
 113
  
Transaction costs are reduced allowing for more efficient allocation of buyers’ capital.   
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c. Issuers 
When handled appropriately, many of the advantages to sellers can translate into 
advantages for the issuer.  Secondary transactions can be used to retain and motivate 
employees.
114
  The company benefits when employees are able to focus on company growth 
rather than personal financial concerns.
 115
  The incentive value of equity compensation can 
become a stronger motivator when employees are able to cash out a portion of their shares.  
However, companies are understandably cautious about allowing existing employees to sell all 
of their shares.  The fear is that employees will lose motivation and therefore companies limit 
sales to a percentage of vested shares.
116,117
  On the other hand, where sales by former employees 
are unrestricted, existing employees may consider leaving if necessary to achieve liquidity.
 118
 
Issuers can benefit in several ways by bringing in new investors and removing old.  
Unhappy investors can leave allowing for better board dynamics.
119
  The pressure to exit earlier 
than the issuer feels appropriate can be reduced if each investor is able to select their own 
timeline through the secondary market.
120
 The capitalization table can be cleaned up, which is of 
particular benefit for companies approaching the SEC’s 500 shareholder limit (beyond which 
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there are enhanced reporting requirements similar to those of going public).
121,122
  Secondary 
transactions can be conducted in concert with primary rounds, bringing in new investors through 
a secondary transaction who are also able to participate in follow-on primary rounds.
 123
   
Transactions in the secondary markets can bring added credibility to private companies 
that could raise the likelihood of later merger and acquisition transactions.
124
  The secondary 
markets can provide pricing validation and can also include a vetting process that has the 
potential to act as a preliminary filter for those seeking acquisition targets.  The secondary 
markets can also allow companies to stay private longer, which can allow them to remain 
competitive (less disclosure is available to competitors) and focused on growth (rather than 
meeting public company requirements). 125   
Secondary transactions normally require some level of information exchange (often to 
both buyers and sellers, many of whom are former employees), which can be a concern for 
issuers.  Issuers also need to be wary of the SEC’s 500 shareholder rule, which, if triggered, 
would require reporting similar to that of a public company.
126
  Prices from secondary 
transactions may need to be used in 409A valuations (an IRS regulation covering nonqualified 
deferred compensation, such as options) impacting the level of benefits available to 
                                                             
121
Michael Pitts, Panel - The Secondary Market – The Value Proposition, SecondMarket Capitalyze 2012 
Conference, New York (February 15, 2012).  Video available at: https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/event-
replay-capitalyze-east. 
122
 Ken Sawyer, Zack Scott and Balazs Veress, A Guide to Secondary Transactions: Alternative Paths to Liquidity in 
Private Companies, Saints Capital (2010). Available at: http://www.saintsvc.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/ 
Secondary_Marketing_Booklet_FINAL_VERSION-9.7.11.pdf 
123
 Id. 
124 Michael Pitts, Panel - The Secondary Market – The Value Proposition, SecondMarket Capitalyze 2012 
Conference, New York (February 15, 2012).  Video available at: https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/event-
replay-capitalyze-east. 
125 Ken Salgado and Ellen S. Bancroft, The Benefits—and Risks—of Secondary Markets for Private Shares, NVCA 
Today (October 24, 2011).  Available at: http://nvcatoday.nvca.org/index.php/from-our-sponsors/the-benefitsand-
risksof-secondary-markets-for-private-shares.html. 
126 Q&A: Small Business and the SEC, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/ 
qasbsec.htm (November 14, 2009). 
84 
 
employees.
127
.  These risks associated with secondary transactions are mitigated by the 
increasing level of company control over transactions.  
 
V. WHY NOW  
The benefits that secondary markets offer have gained importance in the last decade.  A 
dramatic decrease in IPOs has persisted since 2001, as illustrated in Figure 6 below. 
128
  This 
decrease and the associated increase in holding periods for shareholders have placed significant 
pressure on individuals seeking liquidity.
129
  These individuals make up a relatively large group 
of willing sellers.  The tremendous success of the social media sector in the last few years, driven 
in large part by Facebook, has generated a group of willing buyers.  This combination of willing 
buyers and willing sellers at a time when IPOs have become rare is a likely cause of the rise in 
secondary marketplaces.  Because social media companies have been such a big driver of 
secondary market success, many question whether the secondary marketplaces will continue to 
thrive once the key social media companies have all gone public.
130,131,132
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Data source: Jay R. Ritter, Initial Public Offerings: VC-backed IPO Statistics Through 2011 (Dec 31, 2012).
133
   
 
Figure 6 
 
VI. FROM SECONDARY MARKET TO IPO 
There have been relatively few companies traded in the secondary marketplace that have 
gone IPO.  For the five companies for which data is available, SharesPost, IPO, and subsequent 
Nasdaq prices are presented.
 134
  As illustrated below, there is no clear path that share price takes 
through the process.  The secondary market price is becoming a more important factor in pricing 
shares (particularly for option grants); several companies have made reference to secondary 
market prices in their registration statement (Form S-1) filings with the SEC.  
a. Tesla Motors 
Tesla Motors was one of the first companies to transition from secondary to public 
market.  The path of Tesla Motor’s share price through the transition is illustrated in Figure 7.  
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searches. 
0 
100 
200 
300 
400 
500 
600 
700 
800 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 o
f 
IP
O
s 
Year 
IPOs from 1980-2012 
86 
 
The roughly $10 secondary market price was followed by a $17 IPO.  The company then traded 
well above the IPO price for several days, dipped slightly below, then increased. 
 
Figure 7 
b. LinkedIn 
LinkedIn represents another successful secondary to public market transition, as 
illustrated in Figure 8.  The secondary market price increased steadily to over $30, the IPO was 
priced above at $45, and then the Nasdaq price increased dramatically, closing at over $94 the 
first day (some would argue, a case of too much underpricing).
135
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Figure 8 
c. Fusion-io 
Fusion-io followed a path similar to LinkedIn (see Figure 9).  The company traded at $15 
in the secondary marketplace, went IPO at $19, and closed it first day at $22.5. 
 
Figure 9 
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d. Jive Software 
Jive Software’s IPO was priced at $12, below its secondary market price of $12.50 
roughly six months earlier (see Figure 10).  Unfortunately, secondary market prices closer to the 
IPO were unavailable.  Following the IPO, the company’s price jumped to over $15. 
 
Figure 10 
e. Zynga 
Zynga’s IPO price was set substantially below its secondary market price.  After steadily 
rising to $20 on SharesPost, Zynga went IPO at $10, and then had a $9.50 first day close on 
Nasdaq, as illustrated in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11 
f.  Registration Statements (Form S-1) 
Several recent SEC registration statement filings (Form S-1) make reference to 
transactions taking place on secondary markets, indicative of the growing influence of these 
transactions and their use in valuation of common stock.  Brightcove Inc., for example, stated in 
its August 24, 2011 S-1 filing that both management and the board believe that “secondary 
transaction made by nonemployee investors” and a “contemporaneous valuation…are the best 
indicators of the fair value of our common stock” for purposes of valuing certain stock 
options.
136,137
 
In its listing of risks in its S-1 filing, LinkedIn Corporation states that “[p]rior to this 
offering, there has been no public market for our Class A common stock, and there has been no 
public market for our Class B common stock other than the limited trading that has occurred on 
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alternative online markets, such as SecondMarket and SharesPost, which has been occurring on a 
speculative basis.”  Jive Software indicated in its S-1 filing that the company had adjusted the 
weighting of certain scenarios in it valuation “due to the increased number of secondary 
transactions in our common stock”138.  Jive Software relied “more heavily on market indicators 
as opposed to income approach metrics.  Market indicators include both secondary market 
transactions and estimates of future revenue multiples.” 139 Jive Software also made reference to 
the volume and pricing of specific secondary market transactions.
140
 
Zynga’s S-1 discussed the significant number of secondary transactions in its common 
stock that occurred since the fourth quarter of 2009 and how their pricing “was the primary basis 
for determining the fair value of our common stock and Series Z preferred stock….”141  Zynga’s 
board determined the terms of the transactions “approximated those that would be obtained in an 
arms-length transaction” where the participants “included highly knowledgeable, informed and 
sophisticated parties as both buyers and sellers….”142  Zynga also made reference to the volume 
and pricing of several transactions involving purchases from current employees and early 
investors.
143
  
 Facebook’s S-1’s only reference to secondary markets is in its discussion of “an inquiry 
into secondary transactions involving the sale of private company securities as well as the 
number of our stockholders of record” by the Enforcement Division of the Securities and 
                                                             
138 Jive Software Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (August 24, 2011).  Available at: 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1462633/000119312511231091/ds1.htm. 
139
 Id. 
140 Id.   
141 Zynga Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (July 1, 2011).  Available at: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/1439404/000119312511180285/ds1.htm. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
91 
 
Exchange Commission (SEC).
144
  Yelp notes in its S-1 risks, which were also noted by LinkedIn:  
“These markets are speculative, and the trading price of our securities on these markets is 
privately negotiated.  We cannot assure you that the price of our Class A common stock will 
equal or exceed the price at which our securities have traded on these private secondary 
markets.”145 
 
VII. PREDICTIVE VALUE OF SECONDMARKET WATCHERS 
The increasing importance of secondary markets makes them a potentially useful source 
of data for predicting the pricing of companies’ IPOs.  As discussed above, in March 2011 
SecondMarket launched its “watcher” feature to provide investors with a way of tracking 
companies of interest.  I conduct a regression analysis to identify correlations between the 
number of watchers just prior to an IPO and the short-term change in share price after IPO.   
a. Regression Analysis of 2011 IPOs 
There were 42 venture-backed IPOs in the United States in 2011.
146
  SecondMarket 
began its watcher program in March, so the following analysis focuses on the 28 venture-backed 
companies that went public between April and December 2011.  Monthly watcher data for these 
companies was provided by SecondMarket.
147
  The number of watchers just before the IPO was 
estimated as the average number of watchers at the start of the month in which the IPO occurred 
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and the start of the subsequent month.
148
  Companies are not removed from a watchlist after IPO 
unless actively requested by a user so this average is expected to yield a very good estimate of 
the number of watchers just before IPO.     
I regress the 1-day, 5-day, and 20-day change in share price from the IPO offer price on 
the estimated number of watchers on SecondMarket just before the IPO.  The change in share 
price is calculated by subtracting the IPO offer price from the Nasdaq closing price one, five, and 
twenty days after IPO and then dividing by the IPO price.  The data do not support a linear 
relation between the number of watchers and subsequent share price changes (p-values greater 
than 5%).  This is understandable: an additional watcher on Facebook (with thousands of 
watchers) would not be expected to have the same impact as the addition of a watcher to a 
company with no or just a few watchers.   
When I instead regress the 1-day change in share price on the log of the number of 
watchers (plus one to address companies with zero watchers), I find statistically significant 
results:   
1-day percent change = 0.0699 + 0.107 log(watchers+1) 
with an R-squared of 26.3% and a p-value on the coefficient of interest of 0.005.  Figure 12 plots 
the 1-day percent change versus log(watchers+1) and shows the relatively strong correlation 
between the two, particularly at lower numbers of watchers.  In contrast, the log of the number of 
watchers is not significantly related to share price changes over longer (5-day and 20-day) 
windows.  
                                                             
148 For example, Zynga’s IPO was December 15, 2011.  The number of watchers on December 1, 2011 was 5216 
and the number on January 1, 2012 was 5276.  The number of watchers on the IPO date was estimated as the 
average, or 5246.  
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Figure 12 
My one-day regression is influenced by an outlier, LinkedIn, whose share price jumped 
over 100% on the first day of trading.  Removing the LinkedIn outlier results in the following 
regression equation: 
1-day percent change = 0.0920 + 0.0720 log(watchers+1) 
with an R-squared of 18.8% and a p-value of 0.024.  Figure 13 plots the 1-day percent change 
versus log(watchers+1) with LinkedIn removed.   
 
Figure 13 
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b. Updated Regression with 2012 IPOs 
 As of March 13, 2012 there have been approximately 13 venture-backed IPOs in 2012.  I 
gathered watcher data from SecondMarket.com for each of these companies for the day before 
IPO.  When the 2012 venture-backed IPOs are included in the regression, the estimated 
correlation between the number of watchers and the share price increase on the first day of 
trading increases from 0.0720 to 0.0893, with a p-value close to zero: 
1-day percent change = 0.0619 + 0.0893 log(watchers+1) 
Figure 14 plots the 1-day percent change versus log(watchers+1) with the 2012 venture-backed 
IPO data included. 
 
Figure 14 
 
The correlation between the number of watchers and the first-day change in price indicates that 
SecondMarket watcher data may be a useful factor for investment banks to consider when setting 
a company’s IPO price.   
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The rapidly evolving marketplace for private company shares has seen the emergence of 
many new players in the last few years.  This trend is expected to continue, particularly as 
regulatory issues are addressed and changes to the legislative framework are considered.
149,150
  
Secondary marketplaces will likely play a key role in companies’ decisions on if and when to go 
public.  Transaction pricing and other secondary market data are expected to become a more 
critical factor in IPO pricing and in valuing options for 409A purposes.   
 
 
  
                                                             
149 Randall Smith and Jean Eaglesham, SEC Cracks Down on Pre-IPO Trading, Wall Street Journal (March 14, 2012).  
Available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304692804577281844105719500.html. 
150 Legislative and Regulatory Proposals Affecting Capital Raising, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP White Paper 
(March 2012).  Available at: http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/BF-WhitePaper_Legislative 
RegulatoryProposals_March2012.pdf. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The decision by the Federal Reserve to engage in Large Scale Asset Buybacks as 
a way of performing monetary policy has sparked much interest across the academic 
world. However, although there have been several analyses on the impact of those 
buybacks on long-term interest rates and overall macroeconomic effects, there hasn’t 
been much research done on the impacts of those purchases on the microstructure of 
Treasury securities. Therefore, the purpose of this work is to fill this gap by analyzing the 
impact of the buybacks (also known as QE1 and QE2) on the relative pricing of US 
Treasury Securities across maturities and coupons.  
The 2008 financial crisis caused many disruptions across asset classes and the 
U.S. treasuries market was no exception. The special condition of U.S treasury securities 
as “safe-haven” securities caused huge inflows in this asset class in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis and may have caused mispricing in the relative valuation of bonds across 
the yield curve. Moreover, as the crisis reduced overall market liquidity and increased 
risk premia, arbitrageurs who would normally exploit those mispricings might not have 
been able to do so due to impaired balance sheets. 
However, there was one market participant who did not suffer from balance sheet 
restrictions. By engaging in its Large-Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP) programs, the 
Federal Reserved purchased over $900 billion of Treasury Securities from 2009 to 2011. 
In its operational statements, the Fed announced the maturities that it would purchase, but 
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let the actual securities purchased to be decided by competitive auction. Accordingly to 
the Federal Reserve operational statements1: 
“Consistent with prior outright Treasury purchases, these purchases will be 
conducted with the Federal Reserve’s primary dealers through a series of competitive 
auctions via the Desk’s FedTrade system.” 
In order to correctly assess which offers to take in the competitive auction system, 
the Federal Reserve must have some internal methodology in order to assess whether a 
particular treasury security is “cheap” or “expensive” at a particular price. Although there 
is no official information on the methodology used, it will probably utilize some form of 
curve spline fit as described in (Waggoner, 1997). 
Therefore, as the Federal Reserve implements its treasury purchase program, one 
should expect the mispricing of Treasury Securities with similar maturities to decrease. 
As the Fed purchases of securities it deems “cheap”, it bids up their price thus reducing 
the mispricing. There could also be an indirect impact, as the QE program improves 
overall market conditions and the increased liquidity allows arbitrageurs to return to the 
market and exploit any opportunity they see.  
This paper will try to quantify those impacts by analyzing the yield differential 
between On-The-Run (OTR) and Off-The-Run (OFR) securities of same maturity. The 
next two sections will describe how the OFR-OTR spread was measured and describe the 
                                                 
1 Federal Reserve Website, http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/operating_policy_090318.html 
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Federal Reserve LSAP program in details. Then, sections IV and V will describe the 
methodology used to quantify the impact of the LSAP program on the OFR-OTR spread 
and analyze the results. Section VI will try to assess whether there was a difference 
between QE1 and QE2 in terms of the impact of those programs on the OFR-OTR spread 
and finally section VII will conclude and suggest other areas for future research. 
II. MEASURING THE OFR-OTR SPREAD 
In order to measure the impact of LSAP on the OFR-OTR spread, it is important 
to first define how to measure this spread across different maturities and coupons. U.S. 
Treasury Notes and Bonds are issued in fixed maturities such as 2, 3, 5, 7, 10 or 30 years. 
For each one of these fixed maturities, the OFR-OTR spread will be defined as follows: 
ΔYTM = YTMOFR - YTMOTR 
Where: 
YTMOTR = Yield to Maturity of the mostly recently issued security for this fixed 
maturity (On-The-Run bond) 
YTMOFR = Yield to Maturity of a synthetic off-the-run bond with same maturity 
The synthetic off-the-run bond will be calculated by linear interpolation of the 
YTM of securities with neighboring maturities as in (Amihud & Mendelson, 1991): 
YTMOFR = YTMPREV x w1 + YTMNEXT x w2 
101 
 
Where PREV is the bond that matures just before the OTR bond and NEXT is the 
bond that matures just after the OTR bond. The weights are defined accordingly to 
standard linear interpolation: 
w1 = (MaturityNEXT – MaturityOTR) / (MaturityNEXT - MaturityPREV) 
w2 = (MaturityOTR – MaturityPREV) / (MaturityNEXT – MaturityPREV) 
In order to calculate those spreads, this work will utilize daily closing bond yields 
for U.S. Treasury Bonds from January/2008 to November/2011 as collected from Reuters 
DataStream and Bloomberg. The OFR-OTR spreads will be calculated for 2, 3, 5 and 10 
year securities. 7 year securities will not be included as they started to be issued on 
March/2009, so there wouldn’t be a time period without the Fed’s purchases in order to 
compare the spreads. Also, 30 year securities will not be included as there is no OFR 
bond with the same or higher maturity than the currently issued bond. 
The graph below shows the OFR-OTR spreads of different treasury securities 
from 2008 to late 2011: 
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FIGURE 1 – OFR-OTR SPREADS FOR DIFFERENT MATURITIES 
 
By analyzing this graph is possible to see the disruptions that the financial crisis 
caused on the U.S. securities markets. For the 10-year bond, the OFR-OTR premium 
increased markedly during the financial crisis. However, for other treasury securities the 
spread became negative. As the securities being compared have different coupons and 
slightly different durations, this spread should reflect part of those differences. Also, as 
noted in (Longstaff, 2002), this spread should also reflect differences in liquidity, tax 
treatment or repo specialness across securities. 
However, even after accounting for those other factors, the negative spreads for 
short-term notes during the September/2008 and March/2009 period are puzzling and 
require further analysis. It is important to remember that markets were subject to extreme 
dislocations during this period, and participants that would normally take advantage of 
relative mispricings in the treasuries markets had their balance sheets impaired. 
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Therefore, a large volume of trading flows could have caused the spread of short-term 
notes to become negative during this period without attracting countervailing flow from 
dealers, hedge funds or other arbitrageurs.  Moreover, due to differences in market 
segmentation, the 10-year bond spread could have moved in the opposite direction of the 
short-term spread for a short period. As market conditions improved, both spreads started 
moving together again as expected.2 
The difference between short and long-term spreads can also be explained by 
liquidity factors. One possible explanation is that dealers, who are usually the main 
holders of on-the-run securities, had to sell those securities hastily in order to improve 
their balance sheets. Therefore, the yields of short-term on-the-run bonds dropped when 
compared to their off-the-run equivalents. Another possible explanation is that the 
Financial Crisis caused a huge inflow into riskless securities, into a classic flight-to-
quality effect. Short-term notes are the classic riskless security, and thus there might be a 
huge inflow of investor money into those bonds. Given that there is a limited amount of 
on-the-run securities available for each maturity, it is possible that this huge inflow went 
directly for off-the-run securities, which then became more liquid and therefore 
commanded a higher price than their on-the-run equivalents, causing a negative OFR-
OTR spread. As long-term bonds are riskier than short-term notes, the inflow into those 
bonds was not as excessive, and thus their OFR-OTR spread increased instead. 
                                                 
2 Special thanks for Dr. Kenneth Garbade from the New York Fed for the comments about those 
results 
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In other to test this, we are going to regress the level of the OFR-OTR spread 
against the market volatility, as expressed in the VIX. The model will have the following 
form: 
Δ YTM = a0 + a1 VIX 
Where: 
Δ YTM = YTMOFR - YTMOTR 
VIX = Daily closing value of the VIX index 
The results are as follow (in bps): 
 
 
 
 
   Constant VIX R2
Durbin‐
Watson 
2 year  4.10 
(***) 
‐0.27 
(***)  0.35  0.097 
3 year  ‐1.66 
(**) 
‐0.02 
  
0.00  0.087 
5 year  0.56  ‐0.13 
(***)  0.18  0.075 
10 year  ‐13.76 
(***) 
0.72 
(***)  0.37  0.038 
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For notes up to 5 years of maturity, the impact of higher volatility was in the 
direction of lower spreads, which is consistent with the negative spreads seen during the 
height of the Financial Crisis. On the other hand, for the 10 year notes, the impact of 
higher volatility was in the opposite direction, resulting in higher spreads. 
It is important to note that there is significant autocorrelation in the residuals, as 
can be seen in the very low Durbin-Watson numbers. Therefore, it is important to 
estimate robust standard errors in order to assess the statistical significance of the 
coefficients. The results above were estimated using Newey-West estimators3.  
Those results should be taken with some grain of salt, as trying the same model on 
the changes in spreads instead of the levels yields no significant results. Nevertheless, 
even if some other factor caused the OFR-OTR spreads to become negative, there is still 
some evidence of the correlation between higher volatility and lower OFR-OTR spreads 
for short-term securities.  
III. LARGE SCALE ASSET PURCHASES 
Beginning in March/2009, the Federal Reserve announced it would begin a $300 
billion Treasury purchase program in order to improve conditions in the private credit 
markets (QE1). Later, in November/2010, the Fed announced another purchase program 
                                                 
3 The model was estimated using EViews under non pre-whitened Bartlett Kernel with fixed 
bandwidth of 6 similar to (Stock & Watson, 2007) 
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(QE2) that would totalize $600 billion. Moreover, the Fed would reinvest the coupon and 
principal payments of its existing holdings into new treasury purchases, which would 
bring the total value of purchases over $1.2 trillion4. Although almost half of the 
purchases were concentrated on the 5-10 year segment of the yield curve, the Fed 
purchased securities across the entire curve, as can be seen below: 
TABLE 1 – FEDERAL RESERVE TREASURY PURCHASES 
   QE 1  QE 2  Reinvestment Total 
2 year  28.1 41.7 8.3 78.1 
3 year  72.5 154.5 15.8 242.8 
5 year  70.7 183.1 29.8 283.5 
7 year  59.7 190.8 56.8 307.3 
10 year  45.2 155.9 43.9 245.0 
30 year  19.3 31.1 30.2 80.6 
Total  295.4 757.0 184.9 1,237.3 
 
Those purchases were distributed across On-The-Run and Off-The-Run securities. 
As the purchases were conducted via competitive auction, the Fed purchased the 
securities that appeared to be cheaper accordingly to its internal pricing model. 
                                                 
4 The LSAP also purchased around $35 billion of TIPS securities which were not included in this 
study 
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FIGURE 2 – CUMULATIVE FED PURCHASES OF ON-THE-RUN AND OFF-THE-RUN 
SECURITIES 
 
 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
As shown before in Figure 1, the financial crisis had diverse impacts on the 
relative valuation of treasury bonds. While for some maturities On-The-Run bonds 
became more expensive, for others they became cheaper, which could be a result of 
institutional preferences for particular maturities and the effects of the financial crisis on 
their investment decisions and balance sheets. 
However, if the Federal Reserve’s actions were large enough to impact the 
market, it should have an effect of reducing those mispricings. In order to test this 
hypothesis, we will test the following model: 
108 
 
Δ YTM = a0 + a1 Δ COUPON + a2 Δ DURATION + a3 QE PURCHASES + a4 QE 
INTENSITY 
Where: 
Δ YTM = YTMOFR - YTMOTR 
Δ COUPON = COUPONOFR – COUPONOTR, where COUPONOFR is the linear 
interpolation of the coupon of neighboring off-the-run securities as explained above 
Δ DURATION = DURATIONOFR – DURATIONOTR, where DURATIONOFR is 
the linear interpolation of the coupon of neighboring off-the-run securities as explained 
above 
QE PURCHASES = 30d rolling average of Federal Reserve daily treasury 
purchases 
QE INTENSITY = Difference between the current 14d rolling average of Fed’s 
daily treasury purchases and the previous 14d rolling average (D-14 to D-27). 
V. RESULTS 
The regression results can be seen below: 
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TABLE 2 – REGRESSION RESULTS (VALUES IN BPS) 
Maturity  Constant  Δ 
Coupon
Δ 
Duration
QE 
Purchases
QE 
Intensity
R2  Durbin‐
Watson
2 year  ‐0.232  1.306  171.321 
(**) 
0.513 
(**)  ‐0.084  0.129  0.068 
3 year  ‐0.885 
(***)  0.195 
32.528 
(*) 
0.220 
(*)  0.229  0.218  0.108 
5 year  ‐1.330 
(***)  0.208 
16.666 
(*) 
0.418 
(***)  0.073  0.240  0.047 
10 year  10.315 
(**)  4.137  21.140 
‐3.184 
(***)  0.807  0.167  0.011 
(*) – significant at the 0.05 level, (**) significant at the 0.01 level, (***) significant at the 0.001 level 
We can see that the estimated constant of the regression was negative for the 2, 3 
and 5-year notes and positive for the 10-year bond. The constant can be understood as the 
average OFR-OTR spread after accounting for the other variables and, as show in Figure 
1, the spread was negative for short-term securities during the financial crisis. 
The Δ Coupon coefficient is not statistically significant for any maturities. The 
difference in coupons across securities results in different durations, and therefore its 
impact on the yield is already captured on the Δ Duration coefficient. 
The Δ Duration coefficient is positive for all maturities. This is coherent with an 
upward sloping yield curve. If the OFR securities have higher durations than their OTR 
equivalents, they should command a higher yield and therefore increase the OFR-OTR 
spread. 
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It can also be seem that the QE Purchases coefficient is statistically significant 
than zero for all maturities. This should be evidence that the Federal Reserve purchases 
had some impact on the pricing of treasury securities in this period.  
The QE Purchases coefficient is positive for the 2, 3 and 5-year notes but 
negative for the 10-year bond. As showed in Figure 1, in the height of the Financial Crisis 
the OFR-OTR spread became negative for the short-term notes, which would mean that 
On-The-Run bonds were cheaper to buy than their off-the-run equivalents. The positive 
coefficient for the QE Purchases variable should mean that the Federal Reserve 
purchases acted to increase this spread. Moreover, the spread for 10-year bonds was 
highly positive after the financial crisis, and thus the Federal Reserve should have 
preferred to purchase the cheaper off-the-run bonds instead. 
The table below confirms those results and shows that the Federal Reserve 
practically did not purchase on-the-run 10-year notes during its LSAP programs. 
TABLE 3 - TOTAL PURCHASES OF OTR AND OFR SECURITIES 
   OTR OFR % OTR
2 year  13.25 64.86 17%
3 year  98.76 144.01 41%
5 year  67.20 216.34 24%
10 year  1.00 244.01 0%
 
However, the QE Intensity coefficient is not statistically different from zero. This 
could be some evidence that periods when the Federal Reserve increased its pace of 
purchases did not have a significant impact on the spread when compared to the periods 
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before. Therefore, the impact of the QE program on the mispricing of securities could be 
mostly caused by the improved liquidity conditions in the market, which allowed market 
participants to exploit any relative mispricing between treasury securities, instead of just 
the direct impact of the Federal Reserve bidding up the price of the “cheap” securities. In 
order to test this hypothesis, we will build the following model: 
Δ Δ YTM = a0 + a1 Δ TOTAL QE PURCHASES + a4 QE INTENSITY + Δ S&P 
500 
Where, 
Δ Δ YTM = Weekly difference of the OFR-OTR spread. (Current OFR-OTR 
spread minus the spread in the previous week) 
Δ TOTAL QE PURCHASES = Amount purchased in the current week 
QE INTENSITY = Amount purchased in the current week minus the amount 
purchases in the previous week (first-difference of Δ TOTAL QE PURCHASES) 
Δ S&P 500 = Weekly return of the S&P 500 
The results are as follows: 
   Δ TOTAL QE PURCHASES  QE INTENSITY 
Δ S&P 
500   R2 
2 year 
 0.00 
  
0.04 
‐12.38 
(***) 
0.05 
3 year 
 0.00 
  
‐0.05 
‐8.78 
(**) 
0.03 
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5 year 
 0.00 
  
0.00 
‐6.6 
(*) 
0.01 
10 year 
 ‐0.01 
  
‐0.06 
‐14.17 
(**) 
0.03 
 
 As can be seen in the table above, when analyzing the weekly differences in the 
OFR-OTR spread, the amount of securities purchased under QE has no statistically 
significant impact, although there appear to be some impact from the market returns. This 
supports the argument that the most of the impact of QE on the OFR-OTR was indirect, 
as the Federal Reserve actions improved market confidence and liquidity conditions. To 
further test this argument, the next section will compare the impact of the QE2 to QE1. 
As market conditions had already improved markedly during the second quantitative 
easing program, the impact of QE2 on the OFR-OTR spread should be reduced when 
compared to QE1. 
VI.  DIFFERENCES BETWEEN QE1 AND QE2 
The second time the Federal Reserve engaged in its treasury purchases program, 
conditions were very different. Liquidity conditions were greatly improved and the 
spread between on-the-run and off-the-run securities was much reduced. Therefore, one 
should expect the impact of QE2 to be reduced when compared to QE1. In order to test 
this hypothesis, we are going to run the model in two different time periods in order to 
analyze the changes in the coefficients. The first period is going to be from January/2008 
to December/2009 and is going to take into account the Financial Crisis and QE1. The 
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second period is going to be from January/2010 to November/2011 and is going to take 
into account the reinvestment of coupon and principal payments and QE2. 
 
TABLE 4 - QE PURCHASES ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT IN TWO PERIODS 
 
QE Purchases Coefficient
   2008‐2009 2010‐2011
2 year  3.818
(***)
‐0.867
(***)
3 year  0.255  0.390
(**)
5 year  2.463
(***)
‐0.117 
10 year  ‐1.548 ‐0.566
(*) – significant at the 0.05 level, (**) significant at the 0.01 level, (***) significant at the 0.001 level 
It can be seen from the table above that, with the exception of the 3-year note, the 
impact of QE2 was much lower than QE1. Moreover, while during QE1 the direction of 
this impact was different between short-term and long-term securities, during QE2 this 
impact was for the most case to reduce the OFR-OTR spread. 
Those results are coherent with the ones obtained for the previous regressions. 
First of all, during QE2, the OFR-OTR spread (after accounting for differences in coupon 
and duration) was positive for most maturities. Therefore, off-the-run securities were 
seen as cheap and the Fed’s purchases worked to reduce their spread relative to on-the-
run securities. Second, market conditions were markedly better during QE2, which meant 
that market participants were more able to exploit mispricings then during QE1. 
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Therefore, the indirect impact of the second program of purchases would be reduced 
when compared to the first one. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper analyzed whether the Federal Reserve LSAP program had a significant 
impact on the relative pricing of treasury securities. This was estimated as the difference 
between the YTM of On-The-Run and Off-The-Run bonds of same maturity. After the 
beginning of the financial crisis, this spread moved significantly, which could be 
explained by liquidity differences, repo rates or other effects as in (Longstaff, 2002).  
By engaging in Large-Scale Asset Purchases, also known as Quantitative Easing, 
the Federal Reserve purchased over $900 billion of treasury securities between 
March/2009 and June/2011. Those purchases were conducted under competitive bidding, 
which meant that the Fed purchased the securities that it considered “cheap” at a given 
price accordingly to its internal valuation model.  
By regressing the value of the spread against the amount of treasury securities 
purchased in a given period, it is possible to assess whether the Fed purchases had a 
significant impact on the mispricing of securities in the yield curve. The results show that 
the purchases had positive impact on the spread for 2, 3 and 5 year notes and a negative 
impact for 10 year bonds. This impact can be understood as a “direct” effect, caused by 
the Fed purchases bidding up the prices of treasury bonds and as an “indirect” effect, 
caused by the improved market conditions made possible by the quantitative easing 
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program. By testing the effect of the Federal Reserve purchases on the change of the 
OFR-OTR spread of securities, there is significant evidence that the “indirect” effect was 
relevant while the “direct” effect was negligible. Moreover, the results change markedly 
from the first quantitative easing program to the second, which could be further evidence 
that any impact was relevant mostly because dealers and other market participants 
suffered balance sheet constraints that prohibited them from engaging into arbitrage 
opportunities. During the 2008-2009 period, the average impact of the Fed purchases was 
on the order of 2bps for each $1 billion of average daily treasury securities purchased. 
Therefore, on the height of the QE1 program, when the daily treasury purchases averaged 
$2.5 billion during May/2009, this could have mean that On-The-Run short-term notes 
were 5-6 bps more expensive than otherwise.  
During the 2009-2010 period, although the amount of securities purchased 
increased markedly, the impact of the purchases was reduced as market conditions have 
improved. Therefore, although the average daily purchases reached $5 billion during 
February/2011, it had an estimated impact of making Off-the-Run 10-year securities just 
2-3 bps more expensive than otherwise. 
Although those results show that there was clearly some impact of the Federal 
Reserve purchases on the relative pricing of Treasury securities, the impact is not high 
enough to justify a trading opportunity. Although during rough market conditions the 
implementation of a quantitative easing program could cause the OFR-OTR spread to 
change by 5-6bps, the same rough market conditions would mean that market volatility 
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and balance sheet constraints would be more pronounced. In those market conditions, a 
5bps spread is probably not a high enough return to justify the increased risk. 
The Federal Reserve LSAP program was an unprecedented intervention on the 
US Treasury Market and as such can provide the ground for different areas of research. 
This paper tried to analyze the impact of this program by analyzing its impact on the 
OFR-OTR spread, but there are different approaches for this problem that could lead to 
interesting areas of research. First of all, one could extend this study by looking at the 
individual securities purchased instead of an aggregate amount as was done in this paper. 
Moreover, similar to the work done in (Christensen & Gillan, 2012), one could use an 
event-study approach to analyze the impact of the Fed auctions themselves and their 
announcements on the spread.  
Also, part of the hypothesis of this paper rested on the assumption that the Federal 
Reserve used a spline similar to the one described in (Waggoner, 1997) to choose which 
securities to purchase. By fitting different splines and comparing them to the actual 
securities purchased in the QE program, one could try to estimate which parameters the 
Fed uses when assessing the price of treasury securities. 
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